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Abstract versus concrete construal in decision-making groups: How seeing “a group” versus 
“individuals” shapes information processing within homogeneous and diverse teams  
Ashli B. Carter 
 
Modern organizations increasingly rely on teams to act as information processors—pooling and 
integrating various sources of information in order to solve complex problems and reach quality 
decisions. Traditional frameworks for the influence of diversity suggest that diversity can 
enhance decision making by adding to the backgrounds and perspectives that can be applied to a 
given task. However, this additive view of diversity is unable to account for more recent findings 
that show that members of homogeneous and diverse groups differ in their decision-making 
processes even when they have access to identical task-relevant information. I propose a novel 
theoretical framework whereby in homogeneous groups, members construe the group more 
abstractly as a group, while members of diverse groups construe the group more concretely as 
individuals. These differences in cognitive orientation shape relational goals, communication 
norms and additional task-relevant cognitions within groups. I test some of the propositions set 
forth in two studies. In the first, I find that homogeneous group members’ tendency to focus on 
building positive relationships at the cost of thorough task consideration relative to diverse 
groups only occurs at more abstract levels of construal and can be eliminated by priming more 
concrete construal. In the second study, I find that members of diverse groups voice their unique 
opinions more frequently, use more first-person singular pronouns (i.e., “I”, “me”), and use more 
concrete language in their group discussions relative to homogeneous groups. Theoretical and 
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 In this dissertation, I examine how group composition shapes the way information is 
processed among group members as they try to reach a group decision. I first begin in Chapter 1 
by juxtaposing this effort with traditional theoretical frameworks of diversity which emphasize 
diversity’s ability to bring more information to the table—additional perspectives, backgrounds, 
and skills—that groups may apply when making decisions. In the first chapter, I also propose a 
novel theoretical framework that departs from traditional, additive views of diversity to describe 
how a group’s composition may also shape how group members engage with identical 
information. The framework integrates reasoning from the diversity literature with that of 
construal level theory, gestalt processing, and cultural self-construals to suggest that a group’s 
composition will influence group members’ construal level, which will in turn shape 
communication norms, as well as a wide range of task-relevant cognitions among group 
members. The purpose of this framework is twofold. First, the framework is able to organize and 
explain previous findings that show qualitative differences in homogeneous and diverse groups’ 
decision-making processes. Second, the framework is used to generate additional theoretical 
propositions that can be tested empirically in future research. 
 In Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation, I begin to test some, though not all, of the 
theoretical propositions set forth in Chapter 1. In both chapters, I use a moderation approach to 
examine the causal relationships proposed within the theoretical framework, assessing the 
relationship between group composition and various downstream outcomes under different 
conditions of construal. Chapter 2 examines whether group members’ tendency to prioritize 
forming positive relationships at the cost of processing information thoroughly when in 





specifically, in the second chapter I examine homogeneous and diverse groups of executives 
within a classroom setting under conditions of more abstract versus more concrete construal. I 
find that homogeneous groups’ heightened relationship focus and diminished discussion 
thoroughness relative to diverse groups only occurs when group members construe more 
abstractly, and can be eliminated by priming a more concrete construal. In Chapter 3, I examine 
group decision-making processes in a more controlled setting within the laboratory. By doing so, 
I am able to record groups’ full discussions, and as a result, capture additional measures of how 
group members process information when reaching decisions. For example, linguistic analyses 
of groups’ discussion transcripts in Chapter 3 reveal that diverse groups often use more concrete 
language to communicate about a pending decision relative to homogeneous groups.  
 The final chapter of the dissertation compares the methods, sample population, and 
experimental settings used in Chapters 2 and 3 in order to point the way to future research 
directions. I also discuss the challenges and opportunities that accompany conducting this type of 
group decision making research more broadly. Finally, I end with tentative conclusions from the 
current set of findings, as well as theoretical and practical implications of utilizing the proposed 












CHAPTER 1: A NOVEL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR INFORMATION 
PROCESSING IN HOMOGENEOUS AND DIVERSE GROUPS  
 Modern organizations increasingly rely on teams to reach decisions, generate solutions, 
and meet various organizational goals. Within a competitive landscape, teams are an important 
organizational resource for carrying out complex tasks as they allow for the pooling of 
information that individuals would not have access to on their own (Dennis, 1996; Gibson 2001; 
Kane 2010). An essential function of teams, then, is to process information, and teams’ ability to 
reach high quality decisions and solutions will be dependent on how effectively group members 
share, integrate, and utilize information during group interactions (Homan, van Knippenberg, 
van Kleef, & de Dreu, 2007).  
Teams that are more informationally rich should have an advantage over teams with less 
information at their disposal. For this reason, scholars have argued that teams that are more 
diverse can reach better outcomes to the extent that they have additional perspectives, 
backgrounds, and information that can be applied to a given task (Williams & O’Reilly, 1998) 
and can also manage interpersonal conflict and relationship challenges (e.g., Galinsky et al., 
2015). More recently, however, empirical findings within the groups and teams literature 
demonstrate that diversity can also enhance group decision-making even when homogeneous and 
diverse teams have access to identical task-relevant information (for a review, see Carter & 
Phillips, 2017).  
While researchers have begun to document qualitative differences in how homogeneous 
and diverse groups process information differently empirically, the literature still lacks a precise 
theoretical framework for predicting the specific form these differences will take. Integrating 





frameworks for diversity’s effects, I argue that a group’s composition will shape how members 
construe the group—either more abstractly as a group or more concretely as individuals. These 
differences in construal level that emerge within homogeneous and diverse groups will go on to 
shape how information is exchanged and interpreted by members of decision-making groups. 
 In the sections below, I first review traditional frameworks used to understand the effects 
of group composition on information processing and highlight how these are insufficient for 
explaining qualitative differences in how homogeneous and diverse teams process identical 
information. Next, I describe the basic tenets of construal level theory and gestalt processing as 
well as their consequences for individual-level cognition before outlining propositions for how 
construal level will shape perceptions of group entitativity, communication norms, and task-
based cognition, and as a result, information processing in decision-making groups. Finally, I 
discuss implications for performance, similarities and differences of this framework to related 
theoretical conceptions, as well as theoretical and practical contributions.  
Traditional Frameworks: An Additive View of Diversity 
The effects of group composition on information processing have been typically 
understood using theories of social categorization (Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1987), social 
identification (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Turner, 1982), and similarity-attraction (Byrne, 1969, 
1971). According to social categorization and identification theories, when individuals are in 
groups, they seek to establish and maintain a positive self view. In order to do so, individuals 
first engage in categorization processes whereby they make in-group and out-group distinctions 
for those present based on social category memberships. These can include visible or “surface-
level” social category memberships such as age, race, and gender as well as underlying or “deep-





(Harrison, Price, & Bell, 1998). The particular dimension that individuals use to define who 
belongs to their in-group versus the out-group will depend on what is meaningful in a given 
context. To the extent individuals’ social category membership fosters a positive self‐view, 
individuals will maximize intergroup distinctions so that out-group members are seen as more 
different from the self while in‐group members are seen as more similar. Because interpersonal 
similarity provides positive reinforcement for their own traits, individuals will have more 
positive feelings toward and greater desire to interact with individuals who are more similar to 
them (i.e., in-group members) as described by the similarity-attraction principle (Byrne, 1969, 
1971).  
These largely automatic processes of social categorization, identification, and similarity-
attraction give way to two distinct pathways for group functioning. On one hand, the introduction 
of interpersonal difference might make it more difficult for individuals in diverse groups to form 
social connections with one another and may even lead to heightened relationship conflict. As a 
result, diverse groups are often less cohesive relative to homogenous ones (Williams & O'Reilly, 
1998). To the extent that social cohesion facilitates performance, traditional frameworks predict 
that diverse teams will perform worse than their homogeneous counterparts due to the greater 
relational difficulties they experience. On the other hand, however, due to forces of similarity-
attraction as well as homophily whereby individuals are more likely to interact with similar 
rather than dissimilar others (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001), members of diverse 
groups have less redundant network ties compared to those of homogeneous groups. 
Consequently, diverse groups have access to additional information—differences in perspectives 





enhanced by the inclusion of multiple perspectives, backgrounds, and skills, diverse teams 
should outperform homogeneous ones (Williams & O’Reilly, 1998).  
Scholars have identified various moderating factors (i.e., beliefs about diversity, shared 
objectives, transformational leadership) which prompt diversity to lead to either more positive or 
more negative outcomes (e.g., Kunze & Bruch, 2010; Meyer, Shemla, & Schermuly, 2011; 
Pearsall, Ellis, & Evans, 2008; van Knippenberg, Dawson, West, & Homan, 2011). These 
moderating factors can be utilized by practitioners to effectively manage the “double-edged 
sword” of diversity described by traditional frameworks and reap diversity’s potential benefits 
(Carter & Phillips, 2017).  
 Limitations to an Additive View of Diversity 
 Although existing frameworks for diversity’s effects provide enough flexibility to predict 
both positive and negative outcomes that stem from diversity—particularly with the 
identification of key moderating factors—these theoretical frameworks have become 
increasingly insufficient in explaining additional ways that homogenous and diverse groups 
differ in their decision-making processes. Indeed, more recent findings from the diversity 
literature in which researchers use case-based decision-making exercises that hold access to task-
related information constant, show that individuals in homogeneous and diverse groups often 
process available information differently. For example, in decision-making teams, individuals 
are less confident expressing dissenting views and engage in shorter discussions when in 
homogeneous groups compared to diverse ones (Phillips & Loyd, 2006; Phillips, Northcraft, & 
Neale, 2006; Toosi, Sommers, & Ambady, 2012). Individuals in homogeneous groups also 
discuss less accurate information and make more errors than do individuals in diverse groups 





These types of outcomes cannot be attributed to quantitative differences in access to 
information due to the research methodology used in which groups are given a standardized set 
of case facts in order to reach a group decision. Instead, these findings suggest that individuals 
might have a different cognitive orientation towards identical information when they are in 
homogeneous and diverse groups. For example, in direct contradiction to the idea that group 
performance is only enhanced by diversity when minority-group members bring unique 
information to the table, both majority- and minority- group members are more accurate and 
thorough when in diverse rather than homogeneous groups (Sommers, 2006; Sommers, Warp, & 
Mahoney, 2008). Indeed, even in anticipation of working within a diverse versus homogenous 
group, individuals process information more thoroughly (Loyd, Wang, Phillips, & Lount 2013; 
Sommers et al., 2008). Furthermore, these types of qualitative differences between homogeneous 
and diverse groups have been found when group composition is based upon both task-relevant 
(i.e., functional background) as well as task-irrelevant (i.e., campus residence) social category 
dimensions. This suggests that the information-processing discrepancies between homogeneous 
and diverse groups cannot be solely attributed to differences in task knowledge.  
As purely additive views of diversity cannot account for these types of findings in which 
individuals in homogeneous groups show less thorough information processing than those in 
diverse groups when making decisions, scholars have reasoned that these qualitative differences 
can instead be attributed to different expectations about how information is distributed among 
group members. More specifically, because individuals assume greater interpersonal similarity to 
those who belong to their in-group compared to those from an out-group due to social 
categorization processes, they are not only more attracted to in-group members, but also expect 





individuals instead anticipate differences in perspectives between group members. Even if these 
expectations of difference do not align with the actual distribution of information that is present 
within the group, they may still minimize pressures to conform, as well as legitimize the 
expression of dissenting perspectives, the consideration of alternatives, and thorough information 
elaboration in diverse relative to homogeneous groups (Phillips & Loyd, 2006; Phillips et al., 
2006).  
I build upon this reasoning to suggest that a group’s composition may shape how 
individuals construe the group itself—either more abstractly as a group or more concretely as 
individuals. I argue that differences in construal that emerge in homogeneous and diverse groups 
will not only shape expectations of interpersonal similarity of knowledge and perspectives within 
the group, but will also influence how information is communicated between members, as well 
as individuals’ cognitive frame for interpreting and acting upon that information. By drawing 
upon the tenets of construal level theory, gestalt processing, and cultural frameworks of self-
construal, in addition to traditional frameworks for diversity, I put forward a more 
comprehensive model of how homogeneity and diversity shapes information processing within 
decision-making groups.  
Construal Level and Gestalt Processing 
Construal level theory describes the way individuals form mental representations at either 
a more abstract or more concrete level (Trope & Liberman, 2003; 2010). At a more abstract level 
of construal, individuals see “the forest”—paying more attention to the gestalt, processing 
information more globally, and making broader categorizations. At a more concrete level of 
construal, individuals instead see “the trees”—attending more to subordinate features, processing 





variety of targets at a more abstract or more concrete level of construal, with the particular 
content of their mental representation depending on the object. When considering behaviors, for 
instance, individuals can construe more abstractly, focusing on the underlying purpose for an 
action (i.e., the why), or more concretely, focusing instead on the means used to achieve an 
action (i.e., the how), (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). As an example, a graduate student could 
construe attending an academic conference more abstractly in terms of a superordinate goal, 
“learning about new research” or more concretely in terms of a subordinate goal, “booking a 
hotel room near the convention center” (Förster, Friedman, & Liberman, 2004).  
Objects can also be construed more abstractly or more concretely by focusing on their 
central, holistic properties or their specific, idiosyncratic features. For example, a piece of pie 
can be construed more abstractly as “dessert”—a category it belongs to—or more concretely as 
“a homemade blueberry pie with a lattice crust”—highlighting its individual features instead 
(Soderberg, Callahan, Kochersberger, Amit, & Ledgerwood, 2015). Similarly, one could view a 
map more abstractly by attending to the global shape of a landmass or more concretely by 
focusing on local details within the geographic area (Förster, Liberman, & Kuschel, 2008). 
Individuals’ construal level can also shape the type of information they find more or less 
important when making decisions. At a more abstract level of construal, individuals value a 
globalized view of information—placing greater weight on aggregated information such as 
statistical averages and base rates. At a more concrete level of construal, individuals instead 
value a localized approach and are more influenced by individualized information, such as 
anecdotes and testimonials (Ledgerwood, Wakslak, & Wang, 2010).  
Importantly within the context of groups and teams, social targets can also be construed 





a more abstract construal leads individuals to represent social targets in terms of their group 
memberships (rather than as individuals), make person judgments that are more stereotype-
consistent (rather than individuating), and even report greater identification with their own group 
memberships. Individuals also pay less attention to details that individuate people from one 
another and perceive greater homogeneity both within and across social categories when 
construing more abstractly versus concretely (Levy, Freitas, & Salovey, 2002). This greater 
perception of homogeneity is driven by a greater focus on interpersonal similarity when 
processing at a more abstract versus concrete level of construal.  
Gestalt theorists have long considered similarity—along with proximity and shared 
fate—as an important predictor for when grouping occurs in perceptual processing (Rock & 
Palmer, 1990). More specifically, when objects that are close in proximity with one another and 
have a shared fate are more similar, they are more likely to be perceived as a unitary whole (a 
more abstract construal) rather than as discrete components (a more concrete construal). This is 
also consistent with demonstrated links between construal level and cognitive processes of 
assimilation and contrast. For example, when individuals engage in global (more abstract) 
processing, they are more likely to assimilate targets to one another, finding their similarity, and 
include them within a single category. On the other hand, when individuals engage in local 
(more concrete) processing, they instead contrast targets away from one another, noting their 
differences and placing them within distinct categories (Förster et al., 2008).  
Given the importance of construal level for how individuals represent actions, non-
animate objects, information, and social targets, what causes individuals to construe more 
abstractly versus more concretely? Construal level theory primarily focuses on psychological 





likelihood, and are more distant socially, they are construed more abstractly, whereas more 
proximal objects are construed more concretely (Trope & Liberman, 2003; 2010). Importantly, 
there is a bidirectional relationship between antecedents and consequences of construal level. As 
one example of this bidirectional relationship, priming higher power (greater social distance) 
predicts a more abstract processing style (Smith & Trope, 2006) just as priming more abstract 
thought leads individuals to feel a higher sense of power (Smith, Wigboldus, & Dijksterhuis, 
2008). In addition to distance, other cognitive outcomes of construing at a more abstract versus 
at a more concrete level may also serve as primes of construal level. In the context of decision-
making groups, I argue that a focus on interpersonal similarity versus interpersonal difference 
can prime a more abstract versus more concrete construal level among group members.  
When construal level is primed in one domain, there are spillover effects for individuals’ 
cognitive processes in subsequent domains. For example, Förster and colleagues (2008) 
instructed individuals to visually inspect a map in a more global or more local manner. Those 
primed to process globally (more abstractly), later exhibited greater assimilation on an unrelated 
task—judging a person to be more similar to an unrelated target—whereas those primed to 
process locally (more concretely) showed more contrasting in their person judgements. Building 
on these basic tenets, in the sections below, I outline how a group’s composition likely 
influences whether group members construe the group more abstractly versus more concretely, 
and as a result, shapes how information is communicated and understood within decision-making 
groups.  
Construal Level and Group Entitativity  
Building on principles from construal level theory, gestalt processing, and person 





relative to diverse groups. Recent research within the person perception literature demonstrates 
that individuals are able to quickly and accurately make assessments of cross-person variation 
along salient dimensions, which inform their judgements of homogeneity and diversity when 
viewing collections of individuals (Phillips, Slepian, & Hughes, 2018). When there is greater 
interpersonal similarity between individuals along a salient dimension, the collective is more 
likely to be perceived abstractly as a group rather than concretely as individuals. Furthermore, 
more abstract processing of social targets enhances perceptions of entitativity or “groupness”. 
When collectives are perceived as having higher entitativity, perceivers will also assume more 
internal consistency, uniformity, and connectedness between the group’s constituent parts 
(Hamilton & Sherman, 1996).  
While these processes have been demonstrated in the domain of external person 
perception, I believe the same processes may take place for how group members construe 
themselves and the decision-making groups that they are in. Within this context, expectations of 
internal consistency and uniformity (greater entitativity) will likely manifest as assumptions of 
more interpersonal similarity between group members. These assumed similarities could be task-
relevant such as opinions and perspectives regarding the group’s decision or could reflect 
assumptions of similarity along task-irrelevant beliefs and preferences as well (Allen & Wilder, 
1975; 1979). This reasoning is consistent with social categorization and identification theory 
whereby individuals maximize in-group and out-group differences such that in-group members 
are perceived as more similar to the self and out-group members are perceived as more different 
to the self (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Turner, 1982; Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1987). Furthermore, 
perceptions of entitativity and interpersonal similarity that stem from more abstract versus more 





group. Due to forces of similarity-attraction (Byrne 1969, 1971), individuals in homogeneous 
groups will be more motivated to form interpersonal connections with their group members 
relative to individuals in diverse groups. Indeed, I assume that members of homogeneous groups 
will perceive greater interpersonal similarity within their group and will have greater motivations 
to form positive relationships with one another relative to members of diverse groups, as has 
been demonstrated in previous research (e.g., Loyd et al., 2013; Phillips, 2006; Phillips et al., 
2006). However, within the current theoretical framework, I propose the following which has not 
been previously hypothesized:  
Proposition 1: Homogeneity’s positive influence on perceptions of similarity will be 
driven in part by more abstract (versus concrete) construal level in homogeneous relative 
to diverse groups. 
 
Proposition 2: Homogeneity’s positive influence on motivations to form positive 
relationships will be driven in part by more abstract (versus concrete) construal level in 
homogeneous relative to diverse groups. 
 
Construal Level and Communication Norms  
In addition to shaping how group members perceive and relate to one another, construing 
a group more abstractly versus more concretely may also shape norms for behavior and 
communication within the group as well. According to cultural frameworks of self-construal, the 
way individuals construe themselves and their relationships to others, shapes norms for “how to 
be and behave” within social settings (e.g., Markus and Kitayama, 1991, Triandis, 1980, 
Triandis, 1989). Likewise, I argue that the way group members construe their decision-making 
group—either more abstractly or more concretely—will shape communication norms within the 
group. Indeed, as argued and demonstrated by scholars in cultural psychology, when individuals 
have a more independent construal of the self, seeing themselves as more distinct from others, 





When individuals have a more interdependent construal of the self, seeing themselves as more 
connected to others, they are instead more motivated to maintain harmony within the group 
through assimilation and conformity (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  
While independent versus interdependent construals of the self, as discussed in the 
cultural psychology literature, emerge within a given national and historical context, a similar 
process may occur on a smaller scale in decision-making groups stemming from individuals’ 
more abstract versus more concrete construal of the group. Viewing one’s decision-making 
group more abstractly as a unitary gestalt in homogeneous groups whereby individuals are more 
connected to others (akin to a more interdependent view of the self), may also enhance goals of 
establishing positive interpersonal relationships, pursuing agreement, and seeking additional 
similarities in beliefs and perspectives due to heightened group entitativity as previously 
described. A more concrete construal of one’s decision-making group as a set of discrete 
individuals in diverse groups (akin to a more independent view of the self) may not only lead 
group members to expect more interpersonal differences, but may also enhance group members’ 
motivations to express their unique perspectives and individual viewpoints.  
This reasoning that the way groups are construed—either more abstractly or concretely—
can influence norms of communication is consistent with empirical findings in the groups and 
teams literature. For example, individuals not only perceive greater differences in task 
knowledge when they are in diverse relative to homogeneous groups, but they are also more 
likely to voice dissenting opinions when in diverse groups (Phillips & Loyd, 2006; Phillips et al., 
2006). Importantly, these differences occur for both group members in diverse groups who are in 
the social category majority as well as minority, suggesting that diversity may diminish 





research, I assume that members of homogeneous groups will be less willing to express their 
unique perspectives relative to members of diverse groups. However, within the current 
theoretical framework, I propose the following: 
Proposition 3: Homogeneity’s negative influence on willingness to express unique 
perspectives will be driven in part by more abstract (versus concrete) construal level in 
homogeneous relative to diverse groups. 
 
Construing one’s group more abstractly versus more concretely may not only shape 
willingness to express unique perspectives, but may also influence group members’ contributions 
to the group in general. More specifically, when members construe their decision-making group 
more abstractly as a group (versus more concretely as individuals), they may also feel less 
personally responsible for contributing to group processes. Indeed, social loafing whereby 
individuals put in less effort in groups than when working alone, can be explained in part due to 
processes of deindividuation whereby members feel less differentiated from those around them 
or “less like individuals” (Diener, 1977; Guerin, 1983; 1999; 2003; Ziller, 1964). Similarly, 
diffusion of responsibility is more likely to occur when individuals feel “submerged in the 
group” (Festinger, Pepitone, & Newcomb, 1952).  
In the group decision-making context, a more concrete construal of the group may lead 
members to contribute more during group discussions relative to a more abstract construal of the 
group. If all group members are motivated to make more individual contributions, we might also 
expect that there will be a more equal distribution of contributions between group members in 
groups that are construed more concretely versus more abstractly. Toosi and colleagues (2012) 
find more equal participation between men and women during group discussions in racially 
diverse groups compared to in racially homogeneous groups. Utilizing the current reasoning, it 





groups (relative to homogeneous groups) led to more equality between individual contributions. 
Consistent with this view, I propose the following: 
Proposition 4a: Homogeneous groups will have a less equal distribution of individual 
contributions between group members relative to diverse groups. 
 
Proposition 4b: Homogeneity’s negative influence on the equal distribution of individual 
contributions will be driven in part by more abstract (versus concrete) construal level in 
homogeneous relative to diverse groups. 
 
Construal Level and Additional Task-relevant Cognitions 
It is worth noting that some of the earlier proposed relationships between group 
composition and perceptions of interpersonal similarity (Proposition 1), motivations to form 
relationships (Proposition 2), and voicing unique perspectives (Proposition 3) build on findings 
that have already been demonstrated empirically within decision-making groups (e.g., Loyd et 
al., 2013; Phillips, 2006; Phillips et al., 2006). However, to date, these findings have not been 
attributed to differences in construal level between homogeneous and diverse groups. 
Furthermore, by utilizing construal level theory in the group decision-making context, we can 
make additional predictions for how homogeneous and diverse groups process information. 
Indeed, group members’ more abstract versus more concrete construal of their decision-making 
group may shape additional task-relevant cognitions.  
Detail-orientation. Due to spillover effects whereby individuals’ construal level in one 
domain transfers to cognitive processing in subsequent domains, we can expect that a more 
abstract (versus concrete) construal in homogeneous (versus diverse) groups will not only have 
implications for how individuals perceive and communicate within their decision-making 
groups, but will also influence their construal of other targets. For one, more abstract construals 
are associated with a focus on broad patterns while more concrete construals involve greater 





statistical averages) at more abstract levels of construal and instead base decisions more on 
individualized information (i.e., anecdotes) when construing at a more concrete level 
(Ledgerwood et al., 2010). Construal level in decision-making groups may influence how group 
members approach tasks and task-relevant information accordingly. For example, at a more 
abstract construal level, group members may generalize across pieces of information, 
assimilating them together, whereas at a more concrete construal level, group members may 
instead engage in contrastive processes, considering each piece of information with equal weight. 
Empirical findings within the groups and teams diversity literature showing differences between 
how homogeneous and diverse groups are consistent with these consequences of processing at 
different levels of construal level.  
For example, Sommers (2006) employed a mock jury simulation in order to examine how 
individuals reach decisions in racially homogeneous or diverse groups. In this study, participants 
viewed identical case information before deliberating together to reach a group verdict. 
Interestingly, in homogeneous groups, individuals discussed less accurate case information, and 
were less likely to consider missing evidence compared to individuals in diverse groups. 
Importantly, for this study, accuracy was reflected as the degree to which group members 
correctly cited specific case details, or within the current framework, had a more concrete versus 
abstract understanding of case facts. Likewise, construal level researchers have demonstrated 
that tasks that require detecting missing details (conceptually similar to considering missing 
evidence) are supported by more concrete construals (Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, & Alony, 
2006). Accordingly, I propose the following: 
Proposition 5a: Members of homogeneous groups will attend to task-relevant 







Proposition 5b: Homogeneity’s negative influence on thoroughness and detail-
orientation will be driven by more abstract (versus concrete) construal level in 
homogeneous relative to diverse groups.  
 
Desirability Versus Feasibility Concerns. When construing at a more abstract level of 
construal, individuals are also more likely to consider the desirability of actions, whereas 
individuals are more likely to consider the feasibility of actions at a more concrete level of 
construal. These differences may also emerge in decision-making groups in ways that correspond 
with groups’ composition. In fact, previous literature suggests that this may be the case. McLeod, 
Lobel, & Cox (1996), for example, gave racially homogeneous and diverse groups “The Tourist 
Problem” brainstorming task. Within this task, groups are asked to spend 15 minutes generating 
as many ideas as possible to get more tourists to visit the United States. Importantly, 
homogeneous groups were thought to have just as much task-relevant perspectives as those in 
diverse groups. However, when the groups’ ideas were judged in terms of their feasibility or the 
extent to which the ideas could be carried out given the constraints of reality, homogeneous 
groups’ ideas were judged to be of worse quality relative to the ideas generated by diverse 
groups. In a similar study, Triandis, Hall, and Ewen (1965) asked groups who were either 
homogeneous or diverse in terms of their ideological attitudes on a range of social issues to write 
a solution to a given social problem (e.g., how to reduce unemployment in the United States). 
Consistent with proposed differences in construal level between the two types of groups, the 
authors found that when groups knew of their ideological homogeneity or diversity, 
homogeneous groups produced less practical solutions compared to diverse groups. As a result, I 
propose the following:  
Proposition 6a: When completing tasks, members of homogeneous groups will have 







Proposition 6b: Homogeneity’s positive influence on desirability concerns and negative 
influence on feasibility concerns will be driven by more abstract (versus concrete) 
construal level in homogeneous relative to diverse groups. 
 
Temporal Foci. Construal level also influences how individuals consider time. 
Individuals use more abstract construals to represent temporally distant objects and more 
concrete construals to represent objects that are temporally close. Furthermore, priming a more 
abstract construal leads individuals to think of the distant future while priming a more concrete 
construal leads individuals to think more of the present (Trope & Liberman, 2010). To the extent 
that group composition primes construal as discussed previously, decision-making groups’ 
temporal foci may be similarly impacted by construal level when processing information. More 
specifically, I propose the following: 
Proposition 7a: Homogeneous groups will focus more on the distant future and less on 
the present relative to diverse groups. 
 
Proposition 7b: Homogeneity’s influence on temporal foci will be driven by more 
abstract (versus concrete) construal level in homogeneous relative to diverse groups. 
 
Abstraction and Concreteness in Natural Language. Finally, in addition to shaping 
how information is expressed during group interaction as described in the previous section, we 
may also expect that construal level will inform the content of groups’ communication. Indeed, 
more abstract (versus concrete) construal level corresponds to more abstract (versus concrete) 
language. Semin and Fiedler (1988) demonstrate, for instance, that parts of speech vary in their 
level of abstraction. As one example, action verbs are relatively more concrete as they refer to a 
specific activity with a clear beginning and end while adjectives are relatively more abstract as 
they describe enduring qualities that remain consistent over time. If homogeneous and diverse 
teams vary in their construal level, the linguistic content within group interactions may also 





Proposition 8a: Homogeneous groups will communicate using more abstract (less 
concrete) language relative to diverse groups. 
 
Proposition 8b: Homogeneity’s influence on the use of abstract (versus concrete) 
language will be driven by more abstract (versus concrete) construal level in 
homogeneous relative to diverse groups. 
 
Implications for Performance and Accuracy in Decision-Making Groups 
I have argued that differences in information-processing between homogeneous and 
diverse groups may be due to differences in construal level that emerge within these groups. 
More specifically, I posit that a group’s composition shapes whether members construe the group 
more abstractly or concretely which in turn will influence expectations of interpersonal 
similarity, goals of establishing interpersonal connection, communication norms, as well as other 
task-relevant cognitions. According to this framework, in diverse (relative to homogeneous) 
groups, individuals will construe the group more concretely—as discrete individuals—which 
will diminish perceptions of group entitativity, increase individual contributions, and lead 
individuals to approach tasks in a more thorough, detailed manner. I argue that the culmination 
of these processes will shape groups’ decision-making performance.  
In the literature that I have reviewed thus far, individuals in homogeneous groups are 
often shown to be less thorough and accurate in their decision-making processes, and as a result, 
often have worse performance compared to those in diverse groups (e.g., Loyd et al., 2013; 
Phillips et al., 2006). However, when making predictions of relative performance between 
homogeneous and diverse groups that stem from construal level, it is important to consider the 
type of task groups must complete, as well as other contextual factors. For example, the majority 
of decision-making tasks used to assess groups and teams within the diversity literature in which 
task-relevant information is held constant, performance appears to be aided by more concrete 





2008), for instance, require individuals to pay close attention to details rather than on identifying 
broad patterns. Likewise, in the hidden-profile decision-making tasks utilized by Phillips and 
Loyd (2006) as well as others, there is both shared and uniquely held information among group 
members, and performance is enhanced by uncovering and giving equal weight to individualized 
information, rather than aggregating across similarly held information. In other words, 
performing well on these types of decision-making task seem to require individuals to use more 
concrete construals and less abstract construals.  
As a result, we should not expect diverse groups to always outperform homogeneous 
ones due to their more concrete level of construal. Instead, we should only expect this pattern 
when tasks require more concrete cognition. Following this reasoning, homogeneous groups may 
in fact perform better than diverse groups on tasks that require more abstract construal level such 
as identifying patterns or trends (Wakslak et al., 2006). Abstraction can also aid decision-making 
performance when individuals are overloaded by information and can benefit from gist-based 
memory (Fukukura, Ferguson, & Fujita, 2013). It could be the case then, that homogeneous 
groups will perform better on these types of tasks compared to diverse groups. Furthermore, 
detailed, thorough information processing may be harmful for decision-making when time is 
limited and there is high decision urgency. In these conditions, consensus building (and a more 
abstract construal sparked by homogeneity) may be needed instead (DeDreu, Nijstad, & van 
Knippenberg, 2008). With this in mind, I propose the following: 
Proposition 9a: Homogeneous groups will performance worse than diverse groups on 
decision tasks that require more concrete processing. 
 
Proposition 9b: Homogeneity’s negative influence on decision-making performance on 
tasks that require more concrete processing will be driven by more abstract (versus 







Related Theoretical Frameworks 
 The current theoretical framework proposed here has meaningful similarities and 
differences to existing conceptions of the effects of group composition on information 
processing. As previously discussed, when used alone, traditional frameworks of diversity (social 
categorization, identification, and similarity-attraction) can only account for differences in 
information processing between homogeneous and diverse groups to the extent that these groups 
have different access to task-relevant information or experience different levels of interpersonal 
conflict when working amongst group members. By focusing on what diversity adds to groups, 
these conceptions predict that diversity will enhance performance when members bring unique 
backgrounds and perspectives that can be applied to a given task.  
 The current conception of group composition focuses instead on qualitative differences in 
how diverse and homogeneous groups process identical task-relevant information. I propose that 
how group members construe their group will influence how they process information within it. 
Importantly, however, processes of social categorization, identification, and similarity-attraction 
are integral to how this construal forms. Because individuals maximize intergroup distinctions in 
order to maintain a positive self-view, they will perceive individuals within homogeneous groups 
to be more similar and interconnected while those within diverse groups will be seen as more 
distinct. As similarity is a strong basis for visual and conceptual grouping, individuals in 
homogeneous (versus diverse) groups should have a more abstract (versus concrete) construal of 
their group, and this difference in cognitive orientation will go on to shape information 
processing. 
 The current theoretical framework is also distinct from previous conceptions of diversity 





similarity and difference in task-relevant perspectives (e.g., Phillips & Loyd, 2006; Phillips et al., 
2006). While the current framework is built upon and incorporates these ideas, by utilizing 
cultural conceptions of self-construal as well as core components of construal level theory and 
gestalt processing, I also make predictions for how different communication norms may emerge 
within homogeneous and diverse groups, as well as how group members’ construal of the group 
may have spillover effects for additional task-relevant cognitions. For example, individuals in 
diverse groups may not only voice more dissenting perspectives because they expect more 
interpersonal differences in opinion relative to when in homogeneous groups, but this may also 
occur due to heightened motivations to express their unique viewpoints and norms of more equal 
contribution when group members construe the group more concretely as discrete individuals. In 
addition, construing the group more abstractly or concretely will likely lead group members to 
construe decision tasks themselves as well as process task-relevant information in a more 
abstract or concrete manner. This may manifest in groups’ desirability vs feasibility concerns, 
focus on the present or distant future, as well as through linguistic markers of abstraction and 
concreteness. 
It is also worth comparing and contrasting the current theoretical framework to that of 
self-verification. According to self-verification theorists, when diverse group interactions are 
positive, diversity enhances the individuation of group members, allowing individuals to behave 
more authentically, engage in more interpersonal learning, and as a result, group members have 
more accurate views of one another (Swann, Kwan, Polzer, & Milton, 2003). The authors argue 
and find that when group members see each other the way that they view themselves (reaching 
higher levels of self-verification), members of diverse groups are better able to apply the unique 





Importantly, the current framework for understanding the effects of group composition, like self-
verification theory, posits that diverse groups benefit from processes of individuation between 
group members. However, the two frameworks differ in at least two ways. First, and most 
importantly, self-verification theory still reflects a primarily additive view of diversity whereby 
diversity enhances performance by bringing in additional perspectives, backgrounds, and skills. 
To the extent that group members know each other accurately, they will be better able to take 
advantage of these differences. 
In addition, self-verification as a construct is used primarily as a moderating factor for 
predicting when diverse teams will be more or less effective. From this view then, within diverse 
groups, members can either be individuated or seen in terms of their group memberships. Swann 
and colleagues (2003) argue that it is only when group interactions are positive that group 
members see each other more as individuals rather than as members of their respective group 
categories. When this individuation occurs, group members are motivated to learn about each 
other’s unique characteristics. In the current theoretical framework, however, predictions for how 
groups are construed (either more abstractly or concretely) are always based on relative 
comparisons between groups that vary in their composition. As a result, diverse groups are 
thought to be construed relatively more concretely (more as individuals) and homogeneous 
groups construed relatively more abstractly (more as a group). Notably within the current 
framework, predictions of relative construal level between homogeneous and diverse groups are 
based upon differences in interpersonal variation in these groups along a salient social category 
dimension. The current framework does not take into account the associated content of these 
social category differences (i.e., status, power, stereotypes). Indeed, in order to test the 





eliminate status differences between group members within homogeneous and diverse groups, so 
that social distance does not exert an additional influence on group decision-making processes. 
However, despite these weaknesses, the proposed framework has notable strengths as it is able 
account for a wide range of cognitions that shape information processing in homogeneous and 
diverse groups that existing conceptualizations of diversity are unable to explain. 
Theoretical and Practical Contributions 
 Drawing upon the tenets of construal level theory, gestalt processing, person perception 
and cultural frameworks of self-construal, I argue that group composition shapes group 
members’ construal level—giving way to a broad constellation of cognitive processes that shape 
how individuals construe the group, communicate with one another, and approach the task and 
task-relevant information. Together, these consequences of construal level that stem from group 
composition shape how information is processed with homogeneous and diverse decision-
making groups.  
Utilizing the current framework not only helps to explain current empirical findings that 
cannot be accounted for by additive views of diversity alone, but is also theoretically and 
practically worthwhile as construal level has been shown to relate to a wide host of 
organizationally relevant psychological outcomes that may be of interest to both scholars and 
practitioners (Wiesenfeld, Reyt, Brockner, & Trope, 2017). These outcomes include promotion 
versus prevention focus (Förster & Higgins, 2005), communication style (Palmeira, 2015), risk 
perception and risk-taking behavior (Lermer, Streicher, Sachs, Raue, & Frey, 2016; Raue, 
Streicher, Lermer, & Frey, 2015), probability judgments (Wakslak & Trope, 2009), and advice-
taking (Reyt, Wiesenfeld, & Trope, 2016), among others. Indeed, establishing differences in 





additional ways that homogeneous and diverse groups differ. In addition, integrating cognitive 
frameworks such as construal level theory and gestalt processing into the diversity literature on 
groups and teams provides novel avenues for intervention (i.e., priming more abstract versus 
concrete construals) in order to enhance group functioning for both homogeneous and diverse 
teams.  
Remaining Chapters 
In the next two chapters of the dissertation, I begin to test some of the propositions 
outlined for how group composition may shape information processing within decision-making 
groups due to differences in construal level. In Chapter 2, I assess relationships between group 
composition, construal level, group entitativity, and detail-orientation in decision-making groups. 
More specifically, I focus on a particular finding within the groups and teams literature—
homogeneous groups have a greater relationship focus to the detriment of thorough information 
processing relative to diverse groups (Loyd et al., 2013)—and test whether I can replicate or 
negate these findings by priming different levels of construal. In Chapter 3, I attempt to replicate 
findings from Chapter 2 and also test additional theoretical propositions from my proposed 
framework regarding the relationships between group composition, construal level, and 
communication norms, as well as examine additional indicators of construal level in decision-
making groups through exploratory linguistic analysis. I conclude the dissertation by comparing 
studies in Chapter 2 and 3, discussing practical challenges to studying group decision-making, 
and outlining future directions for applying the proposed theoretical framework to understand 







CHAPTER 2: EXAMINING THE MODERATING IMPACT OF CONSTRUAL LEVEL 
ON RELATIONSHIP FOCUS AND DISCUSSION THOROUGNESS IN 
HOMOGENEOUS AND DIVERSE GROUPS 
 With an increasingly diverse workforce and modern organizations’ reliance on teams to 
meet various organizational goals, managers are likely to wonder how best to manage diversity 
so that employees can effectively work together and capitalize on differences in background, 
perspectives, and skillsets to solve complex problems and make quality decisions (Galinsky et 
al., 2015). Indeed, the examination of diversity’s influence on relational and performance 
outcomes along with best practices has dominated empirical research on groups and teams within 
the last two decades (Carter & Phillips, 2017; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998).  
However, this primary focus on diversity’s effects, along with the implicit assumption 
that homogeneity acts as a desirable baseline for group functioning, has been unnecessarily one-
sided—obscuring important ways that homogeneity shapes group processes both for the better 
and for the worse (Phillips & Apfelbaum, 2012). In the case of the latter, researchers have 
recently shown that homogeneity’s tendency to bring people together and foster social cohesion 
directly interferes with group members’ ability to thoroughly consider information in decision-
making contexts (Loyd, Wang, Phillips, & Lount, 2013). More specifically, individuals’ 
heightened goals of establishing positive relationships in homogeneous (versus diverse) groups 
diminishes how effectively individual group members process information as well as the 
accuracy of groups’ decisions.  
Loyd and colleagues (2013) put forth a largely motivational and expectations-based 
account for these findings: When individuals are in homogeneous (versus diverse) groups they 





between, group members. As a result, individuals in homogeneous groups put in less effort 
towards processing task-relevant information. Building on this work, the current paper identifies 
an additional, cognitive mechanism for these outcomes and tests a novel intervention approach 
for improving information processing in homogeneous teams.  
Drawing from construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010), models of gestalt 
processing, and previous findings from the groups and teams literature, I propose that individuals 
in homogeneous groups have a more abstract cognitive orientation while individuals in diverse 
groups have a more concrete cognitive orientation. These differences in construal level between 
homogeneous and diverse groups influence group members’ goals for forming social connection 
as well as the nature of information processing that occurs within decision-making groups. In 
support of this view, I find in a sample of executives that relative to diverse groups, 
homogeneous groups prioritize establishing positive relationships to the detriment of thorough 
information processing when construing more abstractly. However, social pressures are 
diminished and thorough information processing is enhanced to levels more commensurate of 
diverse groups when homogeneous groups instead adopt a more concrete construal. Before 
presenting this study in detail, I briefly outline theoretical arguments for the hypothesized 
relationships between group composition, construal level, and group decision-making processes. 
Theoretical Development 
Construing Objects More Abstractly Versus Concretely 
 According to construal level theory, individuals can construe, or mentally represent, 
objects either more abstractly or more concretely (Trope & Liberman, 2010). At a more abstract 
construal level, individuals see “the forest” or gestalt, focusing on broad patterns that adhere 





parts, honing in on specific features that distinguish objects from one another instead. Different 
levels of construal can be applied to a variety of objects, but importantly for the group decision-
making context, social targets (i.e., people) can also be construed more abstractly versus more 
concretely.  
For example, McCrea, Wieber, and Myers (2012) find that when individuals are primed 
with a more abstract construal, they view social targets more broadly—as members of a group—
while a more concrete construal leads individuals to view social targets more narrowly—as 
individuals. Furthermore, abstract and concrete construals not only shape how individuals view 
others, but also how they perceive themselves. At a more abstract construal level, individuals 
identify more with their membership to a salient social category and also rate themselves as 
having traits more consistent with this group identity (McCrea et al., 2012). Likewise, Levy, 
Freitas, & Salovey (2002) find that individuals who construe more abstractly (versus concretely) 
are more likely to perceive interpersonal similarities between various social targets and group 
them together.  
I argue that individuals can also construe decision-making groups they are in more 
abstractly or more concretely. Construal level theory primarily focuses on psychological distance 
as a predictor for when individuals will construe objects more abstractly versus more concretely, 
with more abstract construals used to represent more distal objects and more concrete construals 
used to represent more proximal objects. However, theories of gestalt processing provide 
additional insight for when objects are likely to be grouped together (construed more abstractly) 
or seen as discrete objects (construed more concretely) that is useful for making predictions 





According to Gestalt principles of perceptual organization, the basis for construing 
objects as belonging to a single group versus as separate objects depends on the degree to which 
objects are proximate to one another, share a common fate, and have similar features (Campbell, 
1958). Within decision-making groups working together on a single task, proximity and shared 
fate between members are likely consistent across groups. However, perceived similarity 
between group members should vary depending on groups’ composition. With greater 
interpersonal similarity along a salient category dimension, homogeneous groups should then be 
perceived more abstractly “as a group” by group members compared to diverse groups (with 
greater interpersonal variance) which should instead be perceived more concretely “as 
individuals”. 
Implications for Group Decision-Making Processes 
Opinion Similarity. Perceiving homogeneous groups relatively more abstractly and 
diverse groups relatively more concretely will likely impact additional cognitions about the 
group. When individuals construe social targets as a group (rather than as individuals), they 
assume there is unity, coherence, and consistency between group members (Hamilton & 
Sherman, 1996). In the context of decision-making groups, this is likely to map onto 
expectations of opinion similarity and difference. If individuals in homogeneous groups have a 
more abstract construal of the group compared to individuals group perceptions in diverse 
groups, they should also assume greater overlap in opinions between group members. A more 
concrete construal of the group should diminish these assumptions of similarity. As a result, I 
hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Under conditions of abstract construal, individuals in homogeneous 
groups will expect greater opinion similarity between group members compared to 






Relationship Focus. Greater perceptions of interpersonal similarity stemming from a 
more abstract construal (e.g., Levy et al., 2002) in homogeneous relative to diverse groups 
should also influence group members’ goals for relating to one another during group interactions. 
According to the similarity-attraction principle, interpersonal similarity provides individuals with 
positive reinforcement for their own traits which leads individuals to seek out and establish 
positive relationships with more similar others (Byrne, 1969, 1971). This tendency in 
homogeneous groups should be reduced, however, if group members instead construe on a more 
abstract level. Hence, I make the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Under conditions of abstract construal, individuals in homogeneous 
groups will have a greater relationship focus compared to individuals in diverse groups. 
Under conditions of concrete construal, this difference will be diminished. 
 
Information Processing. More abstract (versus concrete) construal level in 
homogeneous (versus diverse) groups should also shape how information is processed within 
decision-making groups. Indeed, construal level primed in one domain has been shown to have 
spillover effects for how individuals construe in subsequent domains (e.g., McCrea et al., 2012). 
In other words, construing the group more abstractly or more concretely will lead group 
members to also apply different levels of construal to task-relevant information. At a more 
abstract level of construal, individuals extract the general gist of information while at a more 
concrete level of construal, individuals instead process information in a more detailed and 
thorough manner (Förster, Friedman, & Liberman, 2004; Trope & Liberman, 2003; 2010). 
Likewise, when processing more abstractly, individuals engage in assimilative processes 
whereby they consider information in aggregate form, averaging across distinct inputs. 
Individuals with a more concrete construal level, engage in more contrastive processes instead in 





features (Ledgerwood, Wakslak, & Wang, 2010). If individuals’ tendency to process information 
less thoroughly (e.g., Loyd et al., 2013) in homogenous groups than in diverse groups is driven 
by a more abstract construal level, priming a more concrete construal level should minimize this 
difference. With this reasoning, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Under conditions of abstract construal, individuals in homogeneous 
groups will exhibit less thorough information processing compared to individuals in 
diverse groups. Under conditions of concrete construal, this difference will be 
diminished. 
 
 Influence of Relationship Focus on Information Processing. Previous research by 
Loyd and colleagues (2013) demonstrates that group members’ relationship focus directly and 
negatively impacts how thoroughly members process information prior to group interaction. 
Indeed, relationship focus mediated the relationship between group composition and thorough 
information processing in their study. Although I predict that group composition and construal 
level will have direct impacts on information processing independent of relationship focus as 
described in Hypothesis 3, I expect to conceptually replicate these findings in the following 
mediated moderation pattern: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The interactive effect between group composition and construal level 
on thorough information processing whereby individuals in homogeneous groups will 
exhibit less discussion thoroughness relative to individuals in diverse groups under 
conditions of abstract but not concrete construal (H3) will be mediated by relationship 
focus. 
 
Performance. Loyd and colleagues (2013) also demonstrate that group decision-making 
performance is bolstered to the extent that group members thoroughly process task-relevant 
information. If individuals in homogeneous groups process information less thoroughly than 






Hypothesis 5 (H5): Under conditions of abstract construal, homogeneous groups will 
exhibit less decision accuracy compared to diverse groups. Under conditions of concrete 
construal, this difference in performance will be diminished. 
 
Asymmetry in Receptivity to Construal Level Primes 
 There is an assumption of asymmetry between homogeneous and diverse groups’ 
receptivity to construal level primes that is implied within the previous set of hypotheses. For 
instance, why wouldn’t priming a more abstract level of construal lead individuals in 
homogeneous and diverse groups to be equally focused on building positive relationships or 
diminish discussion thoroughness to an equal degree in both homogeneous and diverse groups? I 
reason that movement from a more abstract level of construal to a more concrete level of 
construal may be easier for members of homogeneous groups than movement from a more 
concrete level of construal to a more abstract level of construal for members of diverse groups.  
In other words, it is likely easier for members of homogeneous groups to perceive 
themselves as distinct individuals than it is for members of diverse groups to perceive themselves 
as a unitary group. I believe this to be the case because individuals always form the building 
blocks of groups whereas groups do not necessarily emerge from the presence of individuals. 
Although members of homogeneous groups are similar along a salient social category 
dimension, the basis to construe members more as individuals is always present. However, for 
members of diverse groups, the basis for construing a unitary group is made more difficult by the 
presence of salient social category differences. In order to construe their group more abstractly, 
members of diverse groups would instead have to generate a new, superordinate identity that all 
group members share. For these reasons, I expect that priming a more concrete construal level is 





diverse groups than priming a more abstract construal level will lead members of diverse groups 
to act similarly to members of homogeneous groups. 
Current Study 
 Taken together, the current investigation aims to provide a cognitive mechanism for why 
individuals in homogeneous groups place greater emphasis on relationship building as well as 
exhibit less thorough information processing compared to individuals in diverse groups. More 
specifically, I examine whether these relationships occur due to more abstract construal level in 
homogeneous groups (relative to diverse groups) and test whether differences in relational and 
informational processing between homogeneous and diverse groups can be minimized when 
more a concrete construal level is primed. To test my hypotheses, I utilize an experimental 
paradigm examining relational and informational processes in decision-making groups within a 
classroom setting.  
Method 
Participants and Overview  
One hundred eleven executives from non-profit firms completing a week-long executive 
education leadership program at a university in the Northeastern United States participated in the 
study. Participants were 66% female with an average age of 35 years (SD = 6.84). Full sample 
descriptives are displayed in Table 1.  
The study was conducted as part of a class exercise that would provide insights about 
group decision-making processes. Participants first read through case materials about a murder 
investigation (for materials, see Stasser & Stewart, 1992) and made an individual assessment 
indicating who they believed committed the murder. Afterwards, participants were placed into 





likely murder suspect. Each group received an envelope which included instructions for the 
decision-making activity as well as all questionnaires. Groups self-managed the completion of 
the exercise, following the packet instructions with no additional guidance from the class 
instructor except for updates on the remaining time for the activity. Groups had a total of forty-
five minutes to complete a pre-discussion activity and questionnaire, discuss the case, reach a 
group decision, and complete a post-discussion questionnaire.  
 I employed a 2 (Group Composition: Homogeneous vs Diverse) X 2 (Construal Level: 
Abstract vs Concrete) between-subjects design. As part of the executive education program, 
executives were divided into program teams of six to eight people who they would complete 
various learning exercises with throughout the leadership program. At the time of the study, 
participants had gotten to know one person informally from their program team during a brief 
program team meeting, but otherwise did not have privileged interaction time with their program 
team members compared to other program participants. As a result, I used executives’ program 
team as a real and meaningful social category distinction to base group composition on within 
the class context that was not confounded with familiarity. Homogeneous groups (17 total) 
consisted of three to four people from the same program team while diverse groups (19 total) 
always had one member who was from a different program team. Subsequent analysis confirmed 
that individuals in homogeneous and diverse groups were equally familiar with the members of 
their decision-making group (p = .14). There were 17 groups in the abstract construal condition 
and 19 groups in the concrete construal condition.  
Materials 
Each participant was given a packet with evidence regarding a homicide investigation. 





note, a newspaper article, and a map of the crime scene. These materials were adapted from 
Stasser and Stewart’s (1992) study and have been used previously to assess group decision-
making processes under sufficient decision complexity (i.e., Liljenquist, Galinsky, & Kray, 
2004; Phillips, Mannix, Neale, & Gruenfeld, 2004; Phillips et al., 2006). The version of the case 
that I used provided all participants with complete and identical information about the murder 
case. In other words, there was no unique information, and all information was shared among 
group members (i.e., there was no hidden profile). The case materials implicated all four suspects 
to varying degrees. However, clues within the case exonerated all suspects except one—the 
objectively correct choice for most likely suspect.  
Procedure 
When participants arrived in the classroom, the instructor gave a brief overview of the 
importance of effective teamwork in modern organizations and informed participants that they 
would complete an experiential group exercise during the class session in order to learn more 
about problem-solving in team settings. Participants were given approximately 25 minutes to 
read through the case materials individually. Participants were instructed to take notes as they 
reviewed the case because they would not be allowed to bring the case materials to their group 
discussions. Participants indicated their own best guess for who committed the murder, provided 
a brief justification for their choice, and indicated how confident they were in their decision. 
Afterwards, the instructor displayed group assignments, and participants went to sit with their 
team members. On each group’s envelope, participants were instructed to first list each group 
members’ name and program team number in order to make group composition salient.  
Before beginning the group discussion, but after groups were seated together, participants 





well a set of pre-discussion questions. All participants in a given group received the same 
construal level manipulation which involved participants either selecting a series of 24 categories 
(abstract condition) or a series of 24 exemplars (concrete condition) depending on condition 
(adapted from Henderson, 2013). More specifically, in the abstract construal condition, 
participants read the following instructions:  
Emerging research in cognitive psychology shows that having an abstract mindset aids 
information processing because it prompts individuals to make broad connections. To 
elicit an abstract mindset, we will have you individually complete a short set of questions 
that begin on the next page. In this set of questions, we will present several objects. For 
each object, there will be two options. One of the options is going to be an example of the 
object. The other option is going to be a group that the object belongs to. We want you to 
correctly identify which option refers to a group that the object belongs to. We want 
you to do this as accurately as you can. So, for example, if we showed you "dog", you 
should pick "animals" instead of "a poodle", because dogs are included in the group of 
"animals". 
 
In the concrete construal condition, participants read the following instructions:  
Emerging research in cognitive psychology shows that having a concrete mindset aids 
information processing because it prompts individuals to consider specific examples. To 
elicit a concrete mindset, we will have you individually complete a short set of questions 
that begin on the next page. In this set of questions, we will present several objects. For 
each object, there will be two options. One of the options is going to be an example of the 
object. The other option is going to be a group that the object belongs to. We want you to 
correctly identify which option refers to an example of the object. We want you to do 
this as accurately as you can. So, for example, if we showed you "dog", you should pick 
"a poodle" instead of "animals", because “a poodle” is an example of dogs.      
 
After completing the construal manipulation, participants completed a series of pre-
discussion questions individually. Groups then discussed the homicide case and after reaching a 
group decision, all participants indicated their assessments of their group’s decision-making 
processes individually before turning in their group envelope with all materials inside. The 
instructor debriefed the exercise, revealing the correct suspect, and led a classroom discussion 







All pre- and post-discussion individual questionnaire items as well as group confidence 
were assessed using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Extremely). All 
questionnaire items, including items that were not the focus of the current analyses, can be 
viewed in Appendix A. 
Expectations of Opinion Similarity and Diversity. I first assessed participants’ 
expectations of interpersonal similarity and difference in task-based perspectives with the 
following pre-discussion items, “How likely are you to discover similarities in opinion in your 
group discussion?” and “How likely are you to discover differences in opinion in your group 
discussion?” (analyzed separately).  
Relationship Focus. Participants also indicated how much they valued establishing 
positive relationships over decision accuracy before heading into the discussion with the 
following items, “I feel that it is more important for us to get along than for us to get the right 
answer” and “I feel that it is more important for us to get the right answer to the Murder Mystery 
than for us to get along (reverse-coded)” which were aggregated to form a scale (α = .83; from 
Loyd et al., 2013).  
Discussion Thoroughness. After reaching a group decision, participants rated the quality 
of their group discussion with the following item, “Do you think the group discussed the 
information thoroughly?” 
Group Confidence. Groups indicated how confident they were in their group’s decision 
by indicating their agreement with the following statement, “We are confident that we chose the 





Group Decision Accuracy. Accuracy was measured at the group level as a binary 
outcome indicating that groups either selected the best murder suspect or did not. 
Results 
 Table 2 displays the means, standard deviations, and Pearson’s intercorrelations for all 
study variables. 
Construal Manipulation. I first assessed participants’ accuracy on the construal level 
manipulation task. Of the 24 items, participants missed an average of .75 questions (SD = 3.58), 
with 90% of participants missing zero items. An independent samples t-test confirmed that there 
was no difference in accuracy between the abstract and concrete construal conditions (p = .98), 
suggesting that the manipulation tasks did not vary in difficulty. 
Test of hypotheses. I expected that individuals in homogeneous groups would report less 
opinion diversity (H1), greater relationship focus (H2), and less discussion thoroughness (H3) 
compared to individuals in diverse groups under conditions of abstract construal but that these 
differences would be diminished under conditions of concrete construal. Likewise, I predicted 
that homogenous groups would be less accurate in their group decisions compared to diverse 
groups under conditions of abstract construal, but that this difference would be less pronounced 
under conditions of concrete construal (H5). Due to the interdependent nature of individuals’ 
responses, individual-level data were analyzed using multi-level models with individual 
participants nested within groups, resulting in non-integer degrees of freedom. 
Expectations of Opinion Similarity and Diversity. I examined whether individuals had 
different expectations of opinion diversity based on their group’s composition and construal level 
as outlined in H1. A 2 (Group composition: Homogeneous or Diverse) X 2 (Construal Level: 





expectations of interpersonal similarity (all ps > .81) or difference (all ps > .34) prior to the 
group discussion. 
 Relationship Focus. A 2 (Group composition: Homogeneous or Diverse) X 2 (Construal 
Level: Abstract or Concrete) analysis of variance revealed a marginal main effect of group 
composition, F(1, 107.00) = 3.26, p = .074, where individuals in homogeneous groups reported a 
greater relationship focus (M = 3.95, SD = 1.52) than individuals in diverse groups (M = 3.48, 
SD = 1.42). However, as predicted in H2, this pattern only emerged in the abstract construal 
condition and not in the concrete construal condition, as indicated by a marginally significant 
interaction between group composition and construal level, F(1, 107.00) = 3.67, p = .058. More 
specifically, in the abstract construal condition, individuals in homogeneous groups reported 
greater relationship focus (M = 4.44, SD = 1.45) compared to individuals in diverse groups (M = 
3.41, SD = 1.49), t(107) = 2.57, p = .011. However, in the concrete construal condition, 
individuals’ relationship focus did not differ between homogeneous (M = 3.52, SD = 1.46) and 
diverse groups (M = 3.55, SD = 1.36), p > .94. See Figure 1a.  
Discussion Thoroughness. Using the same model for analysis of variance revealed a 
main effect of construal level, F(1, 31.32) = 5.64, p = .024, whereby individuals reported greater 
discussion thoroughness in the concrete construal condition (M = 6.16, SD = .79) compared to 
the abstract construal condition (M = 5.74, SD = 1.02). This main effect was qualified by a 
significant interaction between group composition and construal level, F(1, 31.32) = 5.71, p = 
.023. As expected, in the abstract construal condition, individuals in homogeneous groups 
reported less discussion thoroughness (M = 5.42, SD = 1.28) than individuals in diverse groups 





thoroughness between individuals in homogeneous (M = 6.33, SD = .62) and diverse groups (M 
= 6.00, SD = .89) in the concrete construal condition (p > .15) in support of H3. See Figure 1b.  
Mediation Analyses. Building on previous research, I predicted that the motivation to 
form positive interpersonal relationships may directly interfere with group members’ ability to 
process information thoroughly. In the current context, I expected this mediation pattern to 
emerge only in the abstract construal condition (H4). To test this, I conducted moderated 
mediation analysis using the bootstrapping method outlined by Preacher and Hayes (2004). 
Specifically, I tested whether the interactive effect of construal level with group composition on 
discussion thoroughness was mediated by the degree to which group members had a relationship 
focus when entering the discussion. I used the SPSS macro designed by Hayes (2012) for 
mediated moderation bootstrapping analyses (Model 8), creating 5,000 bootstrap samples by 
randomly sampling observations with replacement from the original data set. I then calculated a 
95% confidence interval of the indirect effect of this interaction on discussion thoroughness. 
Relationship focus (aggregated at the group level) mediated the interactive effect of group 
composition and construal level on discussion thoroughness, 95% CI = [-.54, -.04], as expected. 
Furthermore, the direct effect of group composition and construal level was reduced to marginal 
significance after controlling for groups’ relationship focus (p = .067). See Figure 2. 
Group Confidence. I next turned to group assessments of performance. First, I assessed 
whether there were differences in how confident groups felt about the accuracy of their group 
decision. A 2 (Group composition: Homogeneous or Diverse) X 2 (Construal Level: Abstract or 
Concrete) analysis of variance showed no main effects or interactions of our manipulations for 





Group Decision Accuracy. A binary logistic regression with group composition, 
construal level, and their interaction entered as predictor variables did not show any significant 
main effects or interactions of our manipulations for group decision accuracy, all ps > .46, in 
contradiction to H5. Out of the 36 decision-making groups, 18 selected the correct suspect. 
Condition breakdowns for groups who chose correctly were 9 diverse and 9 homogeneous, and 8 
abstract and 10 concrete. 
Discussion 
 The current study generally supported my predictions that differences in relational goals 
and information processing between homogeneous and diverse groups are contingent upon 
differences in construal level within these group settings. Indeed, I provide a conceptual 
replication of previous findings by Loyd and colleagues (2013) that individuals in homogeneous 
groups place greater priority on establishing positive relationships between group members as 
well as process information less thoroughly than those in diverse groups, but only under 
conditions of more abstract construal. When individuals were primed to construe more 
concretely, these differences between homogeneous and diverse groups did not emerge. 
Furthermore, though relationship focus mediated the interaction between group composition and 
construal level on discussion thoroughness as shown in previous work, the direct interactive 
effect of group composition and construal level on discussion thoroughness remained marginally 
significant even after controlling for relationship focus in the model. This suggests that as 
predicted, group composition and construal level likely shape information processing 
independent of relationship goals within these groups.  
I also received support for my reasoning that there may be asymmetry between 





relationship focus and discussion thoroughness did not differ by construal level condition. 
Instead, the hypothesized patterns emerged due to shifts in how individuals in homogeneous 
groups prioritized building positive relationships with their group members and discussed the 
task within their decision-making groups. Without a control condition, it is still difficult to 
ascertain whether homogeneous groups are more easily able to construe more concretely relative 
to diverse groups’ ability to construe more abstractly. However, the current findings are 
consistent with the notion that homogeneous decision-making groups are more responsive to 
external primes of construal. 
While I am still not able to say with certainty that group composition influences construal 
level which in turn has implications for information processing within groups—a direct 
assessment of this would involve establishing a main effect of group composition on construal 
level or on consequences of construal level—the current pattern of findings is in line with this 
view. Indeed, the study findings are supportive of my proposed theoretical framework whereby a 
more abstract (versus concrete) construal level emerges in homogeneous (versus diverse) groups 
in a way that impacts both how individuals seek to relate to one another and how information is 
processed within decision-making groups. When primed to think more abstractly, individuals in 
homogeneous groups show tendencies (heightened relationship focus and less thorough 
information processing) that have been previously shown as baseline differences between 
homogeneous and diverse groups. When primed to think more concretely, these differences are 
eliminated suggesting that homogeneity will only lead to these outcomes to the extent that a 
more abstract construal level is primed within group members.  
 However, not all of my predictions were supported with the current set of data. For one, I 





members’ expectations of opinion diversity within their group. More specifically, I expected that 
individuals in homogeneous groups would expect less opinion diversity than those in diverse 
groups under conditions of abstract construal but that this relative difference would be 
minimized with a prime of concrete construal. I reasoned that these expectations of opinion 
diversity would stem from greater perceptions of entitativity or “groupness” in homogeneous 
relative to diverse groups due to members’ more abstract construal. More specifically, groups 
with greater entitativity should have greater expectations of internal consistency and uniformity 
between group members. Indeed, individuals in homogeneous and diverse groups having varying 
perceptions of interpersonal similarity between group members is integral to the proposed 
theoretical view that the way individuals construe their decision-making group (more abstractly 
versus more concretely) will shape the level at which they construe the decision-making task and 
task-relevant information. 
It is possible that these proposed effects did not emerge in the current study due to how 
group composition was manipulated. While participants’ program team membership represented 
a real and meaningful social category dimension within the classroom context, students likely 
knew that program team assignments were randomly assigned by the executive education 
program without correspondence to internal beliefs or traits. It could be, then, that this 
manipulation was not strong enough to elicit varying levels of perceived entitativity. However, 
theoreticality, these expectations should still emerge even with the use of minimal group 
distinctions (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). Alternatively, perhaps group entitativity 
would be better assessed using a measure of group members’ perceptions of general 
interpersonal similarity and difference rather than asking group members to make specific 





 I also expected homogeneous groups to be less accurate than diverse groups under 
conditions of abstract construal, but that these differences would be reduced when a more 
concrete mindset was adopted. However, homogeneous and diverse groups did not differ in how 
frequently they reached an accurate decision, regardless of construal level condition. There may 
be many reasons for this. First, with just 36 groups, there may not have been enough statistical 
power to adequately capture differences in performance due to group composition. However, this 
is not necessarily the case as Loyd and colleagues (2013) found significant performance effects 
using a similar sample size. In fact, in the current sample, discussion thoroughness aggregated at 
the group level did not even come close to being correlated with groups reaching the right 
answer (p > .79), as we might expect. 
Another possibility for null performance effects could be that groups received too much 
time to discuss the case, reducing the variance for the murder suspect that was chosen across 
groups. As part of the classroom exercise, groups had a total of forty-five minutes to complete a 
pre-discussion activity and questionnaire individually, discuss the case together and reach a 
group decision, and complete an individual post-discussion questionnaire. Because groups self-
managed this process, it is difficult to know exactly how long groups spent completing each of 
these phases. In fact, during the exercise I observed that some groups finished early and left the 
classroom to take a break before class resumed. Even with some groups finishing early, post-hoc, 
it seems unlikely that participants spent more than twenty minutes on the two individual 
questionnaires, leaving at minimum, twenty-five minutes that groups could have used to discuss 
the case. By contrast, Loyd and colleagues (2013) gave groups just 15 minutes to discuss and 
reach a joint decision for the same case and observed performance differences between 





may have reduced the impact of group composition and construal level on group decision 
performance.  
Remaining Questions 
 While the current study provides preliminary evidence that by utilizing construal level 
theory and models of gestalt processing, we can predict when and how group composition shapes 
social and information-processing outcomes in decision-making groups, many questions remain. 
For one, although we replicate differences between homogeneous and diverse groups previously 
found as main effect differences within the abstract construal condition, it is unclear whether 
these differences would have also emerged within a control condition. The theoretical reasoning 
I put forth suggests that baseline differences between homogeneous and diverse groups mirror 
those found under conditions of more abstract construal level. However, an additional study with 
a control construal condition is needed to assess whether this is in fact the case. 
 The current investigation also relied primarily on subjective assessments of group 
processes. While participants’ own perceptions of their relationship goals heading into the group 
discussion are high in face validity, participants’ judgments of discussion thoroughness may or 
may not reflect how information was actually processed during group interaction. The overlap 
between previously demonstrated effects, the hypothesized relationships, and the pattern of 
findings in the current data provide some assurance that participants’ responses accurately 
captured group processes. However, these findings would be more robust if objective 
assessments of relationship focus and discussion thoroughness also showed similar patterns.  
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
While most research on groups and teams examining the influence of group composition 





follow a recent call in the literature to instead shift our attention to how homogeneity helps or 
harms group decision-making processes (Apfelbaum, Phillips, & Richeson, 2014; Phillips & 
Apfelbaum, 2012). The current findings suggest that homogeneity may not only limit the 
perspectives, backgrounds, and skillsets that groups can apply to given a task as previously 
theorized and demonstrated within the literature, but may also hinder certain types of information 
processing by changing group members’ cognitive orientation towards identical information that 
is available.  
This is a useful step forward in the diversity literature which primarily offers an additive 
view of diversity, whereby group functioning is only bolstered by diversity to the extent that 
group members bring additional knowledge and perspectives to the table (Carter & Phillips, 
2017; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). This type of theoretical account, however, is unable to 
account for differences in information processing when homogeneous and diverse groups have 
access to identical task relevant information (e.g., Sommers, 2006, Phillips, Northcraft, & Neale, 
2006). The current work instead suggests that group composition shapes qualitative differences 
in how information is processed within groups, and that diversity, in particular, may aid group 
processing by priming a more concrete level of construal. Indeed, by integrating theories of 
construal level and gestalt processing with traditional frameworks used in the diversity literature, 
I am able to account for both relationship and information-processing differences between 
homogeneous and diverse groups with a single cognitive mechanism. This reflects another 
benefit of using construal level theory in organizational research—a burgeoning new area of 
inquiry (Wiesenfeld, Reyt, Brockner, & Trope, 2017).  
Using this interdisciplinary approach also extends theoretical understandings of construal 





non-social dimensions is not new to this area, thus far, no one has used this framework to 
understand information processing within homogeneous and diverse groups. The idea that 
construal level—an individual-level cognition—can emerge within social groups (due to group 
composition) and go on to shape how information is processed within the group is also quite 
novel. This dynamic approach which spans multiple levels of analysis can potentially enhance 
our understanding of both the antecedents to and consequences of construing at more abstract or 
more concrete levels. 
The current study also provides useful practical insights. More specifically, by using a 
moderation approach to investigate relational and information-processing outcomes in 
homogeneous and diverse groups, I identify a novel (and subtle) cognitive intervention for 
improving group decision-making processes. To the extent that homogeneous teams within 
organizations experience relationship pressures that interfere with task goals, managers may 
prime a more concrete construal level among group members. Indeed, focusing group members’ 
attention on specific examples prior to group discussions may help counteract this challenge 
faced by homogeneous groups. This is not to say that diversity is not needed in decision-making 
groups. Indeed, as described by additive views of diversity, greater team diversity broadens the 
perspectives and backgrounds that can be applied to a given task. However, to the extent that 
diversity also enhances group decision-making processes by priming a more concrete level of 
construal, managers may be able to mimic these effects through other means. Taken together, 
examining the influence of construal level on decision-making processes in homogeneous and 







CHAPTER 3: EXPLORING THE EFFECTS OF GROUP COMPOSITION AND 
CONSTRUAL LEVEL ON INFORMATION PROCESSING IN A LAB SETTING 
 While the previous study provided many insights into the role of construal level in 
homogeneous and diverse decision-making groups, many questions remain. For one, would we 
observe the same patterns of heightened relationship focus and diminished discussion 
thoroughness in homogeneous relative to diverse groups (that were demonstrated when 
participants adopted a more abstract construal level) within a control condition? This question is 
particularly important to address as it can shed light on whether differences in decision-making 
processes between homogeneous and diverse groups at baseline are driven primarily by more 
abstract versus more concrete construals.  
 In addition, due to the classroom setting used in the previous investigation, there were 
many questions regarding differences in construal level and their effects on information 
processing in homogeneous and diverse groups that were simply unobservable. In particular, 
although I was able to collect measures of relationship focus and discussion thoroughness, I was 
not able to assess the relationships between group composition and construal level on 
communication patterns during group interaction nor assess levels of abstraction/concreteness in 
homogeneous and diverse groups’ natural language speech patterns. Furthermore, in the previous 
study, all measures (except group decision-making performance) were based on subjective 
assessments.  
 To address these issues, I conducted an additional study on group decision-making 
processes with homogeneous and diverse groups in a lab setting with the goal of replicating and 
extending insights gleaned from the previous study. The current study was also designed to 





types of group decisions that are made in actual organizations (i.e., personnel selection). In 
addition to taking these steps to build upon the last study, in the current investigation, I also aim 
to take a step back and test some of the basic tenets of the proposed theoretical framework from 
Chapter 1 that by shaping construal level, group composition shapes information processing by 
influencing perceptions of group entitativity, communication norms, and additional task-relevant 
cognitions. Before describing the current study in detail, I first briefly review relevant theoretical 
propositions from the first chapter, as well as outline specific hypotheses that will be tested in the 
current investigation.  
Construal Level in Homogeneous and Diverse Groups 
 Drawing on construal level theory, principles of Gestalt psychology, person perception, 
and cultural self-construals, I argue that the way individuals view their decision-making 
groups—either more abstractly as a group or more concretely as individuals—will shape the way 
information is processed within the group. Furthermore, I posit that homogeneous groups will be 
construed more abstractly by group members relative to diverse groups, which will be construed 
more concretely by group members. This is based on the applications of Gestalt processing on 
person perception whereby social objects that are similar, proximate, and share a common fate 
are more likely to be grouped together (Campbell, 1958). Holding interpersonal proximity and 
common fate constant between decision-making groups, homogeneous groups who are similar 
along a salient social category dimension should be seen more abstractly as “a group”. Diverse 
groups who have greater interpersonal variance along a salient social category dimension should 
instead be perceived relatively more concretely as “individuals”.  
These ideas are consistent with work from the construal level theory literature in which 





when they adopt a more abstract (versus concrete) level of construal (Levy, Freitas, & Salovey, 
2002; McCrea, Wieber, & Myers, 2012). Indeed, I expect the opposite direction of influence to 
also occur where perceptions of homogeneity and interpersonal similarity will prime a more 
abstract level of construal, and perceptions of diversity and interpersonal difference will prime a 
more concrete level of construal. Furthermore, I argue that construing abstractly versus 
concretely will have consequences for perceptions of group entitativity, communication norms, 
and additional task-based cognitions and decision-making performance. These consequences as 
well as specific hypotheses that will be tested in the current study are outlined below. 
Consequences of Group Entitativity 
 When individuals perceive social targets more abstractly as groups rather than more 
concretely as individuals, they are also more likely to perceive greater entitativity or “groupness” 
among members, assuming that there is uniformity, consistency, and coherence between 
members’ traits and behaviors (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). In the context of decision-making 
groups, members of homogeneous groups should perceive themselves to be more similar relative 
to members of diverse groups. As a result, I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Individuals in homogeneous groups will perceive greater 
interpersonal similarity between group members compared to individuals in diverse 
groups at baseline and under conditions of more abstract construal level. Under 
conditions of more concrete construal, this difference will be diminished. 
 
Due to greater perceptions of interpersonal similarity stemming from perceived entitativity and 
forces of similarity-attraction (Byrne 1969, 1971), members of homogeneous groups will also 
have greater motivations to form social connections than members of diverse groups. 







Hypothesis 2 (H2): Individuals in homogeneous groups will have a greater relationship 
focus compared to individuals in diverse groups at baseline and under conditions of more 




Similar to cultural self-construals which define the “right way to be or behave” in relation 
to others (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991), I argue that the way group members construe their 
decision-making group will influence communication norms within the group. Construing the 
decision-making group more abstractly as a group should enhance pressures for group members 
to conform and assimilate to one another. Construing the decision-making group more abstractly 
as individuals should instead enhance group members’ motivations to express their unique 
viewpoints. As a result, I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Individuals in homogeneous groups will be less willing to express 
their unique perspectives compared to individuals in diverse groups at baseline and under 
conditions of more abstract construal level. Under conditions of more concrete construal, 
this difference will be diminished. 
 
Group members’ more abstract or more concrete construal of their decision-making group will 
also likely shape expectations for individual contributions between group members. Indeed, 
construing the group more abstractly as a group versus more concretely as individuals should 
lower expectations for individual contributions. As a result, construing the group at a more 
abstract level should lead all group members to contribute less to group discussions. On the other 
hand, construing at a more concrete level of construal should lead all group members to 
contribute more to group discussions. Consequently, I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Homogeneous groups will have shorter discussions compared to 
diverse groups at baseline and under conditions of more abstract construal level. Under 







Hypothesis 5 (H5): Homogeneous groups will have less equal participation between 
group members compared to diverse groups at baseline and under conditions of more 
abstract construal level. Under conditions of more concrete construal, this difference will 
be diminished. 
 
Task-relevant Cognition and Decision-Making Performance 
More or less abstract/concrete construals stemming from group composition will also 
have spillover effects for how group members approach tasks and interpret task-relevant 
information. When processing at a more abstract construal level, individuals focus attention more 
broadly, whereas at a more concrete construal level, individuals instead focus their attention 
narrowly, in a more thorough and detail-oriented manner (Trope & Liberman, 2010; 
Ledgerwood, Wakslak, & Wang, 2010). I expect similar processes to emerge in decision-making 
groups in the following pattern: 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Individuals in homogeneous groups will discuss task-relevant 
information less thoroughly compared to individuals in diverse groups at baseline and 
under conditions of more abstract construal level. Under conditions of more concrete 
construal, this difference will be diminished. 
 
In addition, group performance on decision tasks that require thorough analysis of disparate 
sources of information (as the one used in the current study) should be enhanced to the degree 
that group members have a more concrete construal level and diminished to the degree that 
group members instead process at a more abstract level of construal. Accordingly, I hypothesize 
the following: 
Hypothesis 7 (H7): Homogeneous groups will have worse decision-making performance 
compared to diverse groups at baseline and under conditions of more abstract construal 
level. Under conditions of more concrete construal, this difference will be diminished. 
 
Finally, construing at a more abstract or more concrete level should influence the abstraction and 
concreteness of group members’ speech when discussing task-relevant information during group 





Hypothesis 8 (H8): Homogeneous groups will communicate using more abstract and less 
concrete language compared to diverse groups at baseline and under conditions of more 




 As reflected in hypotheses above, the current investigation aims to replicate findings 
from the previous study as well as assess additional indicators of construal level differences 
between homogeneous and diverse decision-making groups. In terms of replication, I wanted to 
assess whether members of homogeneous groups again had a greater relationship focus and as a 
result, less thorough discussions relative to members of diverse groups when processing at a 
more abstract construal level but not at a more concrete construal level. I also sought to extend 
these findings in the current study by finding these differences in relationship focus and 
discussion thoroughness at baseline (within a control construal condition). As described 
previously in Chapter 2 and implicit within the current set of hypotheses, I again assume that 
there will be an asymmetry in receptivity to construal level primes between homogeneous and 
diverse groups. More specifically, I assume that homogeneous groups will be more influenced by 
primes of concrete construal than diverse groups will be influenced by primes of abstract 
construal. 
 Finally, in addition to replication, with the ability to record group interactions within a 
laboratory setting, the current study also allows me to assess how group composition and 
construal level shape communication norms (through the measurement of individuals’ 
contributions to group discussions), as well as additional task-relevant cognitions, including the 








Participants and Overview. Three hundred fifty-six adults were recruited for a study 
about how groups make decisions from a behavioral research participant pool at a university in 
the Northeastern United States composed primarily of undergraduate students (84%). 
Participants were 59% female with an average age of 24 years (SD = 6.29). Full sample 
descriptives are displayed in Table 1. All participants received $16 for their participation. In 
addition, best performing groups were entered into a raffle and a few were randomly selected to 
win online gift cards. 
After arriving at the lab and providing informed consent, participants were seated in a 
computer lab and individually read case materials about a fictional company, Grogan Airlines, 
who needed to replace their Vice President of Information Technology (Ames, 2008). 
Participants were asked to imagine that they were one of three company executives at Grogan 
Air charged with making the hiring decision. After reading case information, participants 
indicated their own hiring preference before completing a dot-estimation filler task which formed 
the basis of the group composition manipulation. Afterwards, participants were placed into 
groups of three to discuss the case together and come to a group decision on who to hire. Once 
seated together, groups completed a pre-discussion activity and questionnaire individually, then 
discussed the case and reached a group decision together, before finally completing a post-
discussion questionnaire individually. Groups were given approximately fifteen minutes to 
discuss the case, receiving a five-minute warning if necessary.  
 I employed a 2 (Group Composition: Homogeneous vs Diverse) X 3 (Construal Level: 
Abstract vs Concrete vs Control) between-subjects design. Group composition was based on a 





materials and indicating their individual preference, participants were told that they would do a 
short dot estimation task (adapted from Zhong, Phillips, Leonardelli, & Galinsky, 2008) before 
meeting with their colleagues. The task required participants to view varying patterns of small 
red and blue dots appearing on 10 computer screens and estimate whether there were more red 
dots or more blue dots on each screen. After doing so, participants were told that based on their 
responses, they were either a red or blue type. In reality, type was randomly assigned. 
Participants did not receive any additional information about the meaning or significance of their 
type assignment but this social category dimension formed the basis for group composition. 
Homogeneous groups (59 total) consisted of three people who were all of the same type (either 
red or blue) while diverse groups (60 total) had one member who had a different type than the 
other two members. There were 40 groups in the abstract, 39 groups in the concrete, and 40 
groups in the control construal condition.  
Materials. Each participant read case materials about a fictional company, Grogan 
Airlines, who needed to replace their Vice President of Information Technology. Participants 
were asked to imagine that they were also at the Vice President level at Grogan Air and as a 
result, would help make the hiring decision. Materials included an organization chart, 
information about the company, as well as general information about each of three finalists for 
the open position (i.e., candidates’ current and past positions, and educational background) 
compiled by Human Resources. Participants also read information about the candidates that they 
themselves had supposedly collected from reliable sources within Grogan Air. Most case 
materials were read on a computer screen. However, general candidate information compiled by 
Human Resources was printed on a handout on which participants could take notes to take into 





The materials were adapted from a teaching case used for an MBA classroom exercise to 
simulate group decision making in organizations (Ames, 2008). The version of the case that I 
used contained 18 key characteristics (6 for each candidate) that were critical for choosing the 
best candidate. Each candidate had a mixture of strengths and weaknesses. The ideal candidate 
(Candidate A) had 5 strengths and 1 weakness while the remaining candidates had 4 strengths 
and 2 weaknesses (Candidate B) and 3 strengths and 3 weaknesses (Candidate C), respectively. 
However, this information was distributed among the three group members such that each group 
member held some unique information pertinent to identifying the best candidate. For the ideal 
choice (Candidate A), only 2 (of 4) strengths and their single weakness were shared among all 
group members. For suboptimal choice Candidate B, all 4 strengths and 1 (of 2) weaknesses 
were shared among group members. For suboptimal choice Candidate C, two (of 3) strengths and 
1 (of 3) weaknesses were shared among group members. With information distributed in this 
way, Candidate B appears to be an obvious choice despite being objectively inferior. In all 
decision-making groups, a hidden profile existed because the best candidate (Candidate C) was 
more likely to be found if the unique information that group members held was shared.  
Procedure. When participants arrived in the lab, they were greeted by either a male or 
female research assistant and read study information in order to give informed consent. 
Participants sat in a common waiting area until all participants had arrived. Study timeslots were 
posted so that two groups of three could be run in a single session, however, this was not always 
possible due to low rates of study sign up. Out of the total 119 decision-making groups, 64 
groups participated in the study with another group. Once everyone was present, participants 
were led into a computer room to begin the first phase of the study. Participants each read 





working in a group to make a hiring decision. Participants then read materials for the Grogan Air 
case and were instructed to take notes on the general candidate information worksheet next to 
their computer as they would not be able to bring additional information into their group 
discussion directly.  
After participants read through the case information, they indicated their initial choice for 
the open position. Next, participants completed a short dot estimation task, estimating whether 
there were more red or blue dots on a series of 10 screens, each with a random and ambiguous 
assortment of small red and blue dots. Participants were then assigned a type—red or blue—that 
was supposedly based on their choices on the dot estimation task, but were in reality, randomly 
assigned. Once all participants received a type, a researcher assistant came into the computer 
room to assign participants to decision-making groups. The researcher assistant announced that 
in some teams, all members would be of the same type while other teams would have different 
types. When two groups participated at the same time, one group was homogeneous and the 
other diverse. Members of each group were led into a separate room for their group discussion. 
Decision rooms each had three chairs equally distributed around a table. On the table were three 
markers that group members could use to take notes on a large notepad in the room. Finally, an 
iPad was setup on an easel along a back wall to record the group interaction.  
Before beginning the group discussion, but after groups were seated together, participants 
completed a short activity individually which served as our manipulation of construal level, as 
well a set of pre-discussion questions. All participants in a given group received the same 
construal level manipulation which involved participants either selecting a series of 24 categories 
(abstract condition), a series of 24 exemplars (concrete condition; adapted from Henderson, 





condition (adapted from Mallett, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2008). Individuals in the abstract and 
concrete construal conditions read the same instructions as in the Chapter 1 study. The 
instructions for the control condition read as follows: 
Emerging research in cognitive psychology shows that having a warm up task aids 
decision making because it activates individuals’ cognition. To elicit this, we will have 
you individually complete a short set of questions that begin on the next page.  In this set 
of questions, there will be two options. We want you to identify which option you prefer. 
Do not spend too much time thinking about your choice.       
 
After completing the construal manipulation, participants completed a series of pre-
discussion questions individually. The research assistant then came into the room to give 
additional instructions and turn on the iPad to record the interaction. The research assistant 
reminded participants that they would have fifteen minutes to discuss and reach a decision and 
that if their team selected the best candidate, they would be entered into a raffle for the chance of 
each earning a $25 bonus. Research assistants also prompted group members to say their 
participant number and type aloud so that the group’s composition was salient. Groups then 
discussed the hiring case. After ten minutes, groups were given a five-minute warning and after 
the allotted time was finished, the research assistant came back into the room to record the group 
decision and turn off video recording. Afterwards, participants completed a post-discussion 
questionnaire individually and once finished, were debriefed about the nature of the study and 
paid for their participation.  
Measures 
To get a comprehensive view of how information was processed within the decision-
making groups, I used a mix of subjective and objective, individual- and group-level measures. 
All pre- and post-discussion questionnaire items were assessed using a 7-point Likert scale 





Appendix B. In addition, videos of group discussions were transcribed using an independent 
transcription service in order to assess communication norms and abstraction/concreteness of 
groups’ speech. 
Linguistic Analysis Approach. The majority of the measures used for linguistic analysis 
came from the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC), a text analysis application developed 
to aid exploratory study of language and disclosure (Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn, 
2015). LIWC is made up of a default dictionary of 6,400 words and word stems with 82 
subdictionaries for assessing particular domains. I browsed the default LIWC2015 Dictionary 
categories and prior to analysis, selected seven categories that I believed may align with 
indicators of construal level or hypothesized communication norms during group discussion 
based on previous literature. These included the following subdictionaries for more concrete 
construal: common verbs (i.e., “eat”, “come:”, “carry”), comparisons (i.e., “greater”, “best”, 
“after”), differentiation (i.e., “hasn’t”, “but”, “else”), and present focus (i.e., “today”, “is”, 
“now”); the following subdictionaries for more abstract construal level: analytical thinking (i.e., 
reflecting more categorical language and abstract thinking) and certainty (i.e., “always”, 
“never”); and the following subcategory for individual expression: first-person singular personal 
pronouns (i.e., “I”, “me”, “mine”). LIWC output variables for most subdictionaries are expressed 
as percentage of total words. For summary variables like analytical thinking (categorical 
language), however, LIWC output is a standardize composite that have been converted to a 
percentile based on large corpora of texts (Pennebaker, Booth, Boyd, & Francis, 2015).  
In addition, I also used a database of 40,000 English words rated on their level of 
concreteness (developed by Brysbaert, Warriner, & Kuperman; 2014) to score groups’ 





dictionary, each group’s transcript was scored on the average concreteness of its component 
words. 
Consequences of Group Entitativity Measures 
Perceptions of General Interpersonal Similarity. Participants indicated their 
perceptions of general interpersonal similarity with the following items, “How similar do you 
feel to the other members in your group?” and “Do you feel you have a lot in common with the 
other members of your group?” (α = .82).  
Expectations of Opinion Similarity and Difference. Participants also indicated their 
expectations of interpersonal similarity along task-relevant dimensions with the following items, 
“How likely are you to discover similarities in opinion in your group discussion?” and “How 
likely are you to discover differences in opinion in your group discussion?” (These items did not 
form a reliable scale and were analyzed separately). 
Relationship Focus. Participants indicated how much they valued establishing positive 
relationships with their group members before heading into the discussion with the following 
items, “I feel that it is important for us to get along during the discussion” and “I feel that it is 
more important for us to get along than for us to get the right answer.” (These items were also 
analyzed separately as they did not form a reliable scale). 
Communication Norms Measures 
Perceived Voice. After the group discussion, individuals indicated the degree to which 
they felt they had voice during the group discussion with the following items, “How much did 
you feel like you were free to express your opinion?” and “How comfortable were you voicing 





Individual Speaking Contribution. For an objective measure of individuals’ 
contributions to the group discussion, video transcripts were coded for how many speaking turns 
each group member had as well as how many words each group member spoke. This quantitative 
measure is consistent with other approaches of assessing individual contribution used in previous 
research on group decision making (Chidambaram & Tung, 2005; Hirokawa & Pace 1983).  
First-person singular pronouns. As an additional objective measure for group 
members’ willingness to express their unique views, group transcripts were entered into LIWC 
and assessed with the first-person singular personal pronouns (i.e., “I”, “me”, “mine”) 
subdictionary. 
Group Discussion Time. Videos transcripts included timestamps to assess how long 
groups spent discussing the task. The end of groups’ discussions was marked as when all group 
members agreed to a single candidate.  
Equal Participation. I assessed whether groups had equal participation between group 
members during group discussions by measuring the variance in the percentage of total number 
of speaking turns between group members as well as the variance in percentage of the total 
number of words spoken between group members. 
Task-Relevant Cognition and Decision-Making Performance Measures 
Discussion Thoroughness. Participants rated the quality of their group discussion with 
the following item, “Do you think the group discussed the information thoroughly?” 
Group Decision Accuracy. Accuracy was measured at the group level as a binary 





Concrete Language. Each group’s discussion transcript was scored on concreteness 
using the Brysbaert et al. (2014) concreteness dictionary as well as LIWC subdictionaries for 
common verbs, comparisons, differentiation, and present focus. 
Abstract Language. Groups’ discussion transcripts were also scored on abstraction 
using the LIWC subdictionaries for analytical thinking (categorical language) and certainty. 
Results 
To test the hypotheses put forth, for all measures except group decision accuracy, I ran a 
2 (Group composition: Homogeneous or Diverse) X 3 (Construal Level: Abstract, Concrete, or 
Control) analysis of variance. Due to the interdependent nature of individuals’ responses, 
individual-level data were analyzed using multi-level ANOVAs with individual participants 
nested within groups, resulting in non-integer degrees of freedom. Tables 3 and 4 display the 
means, standard deviations, and Pearson’s intercorrelations for all individual-level (Table 3) and 
group-level (Table 4) study variables. 
When hypothesized interaction patterns did not reach significance, I also conducted 
independent-sample t-tests comparing outcomes in homogeneous versus diverse groups within 
the control construal condition only, as post-hoc exploratory analysis1. These additional analyses 
were conducted to gauge whether there were baseline differences between homogeneous and 
diverse groups in the expected directions and are only noted below when significant or 
marginally significant.  
Construal Manipulation. I first assessed participants’ accuracy on the construal level 
manipulation task for those in the abstract and concrete construal conditions. Of the 24 items, 
                                                          
1 There were a total 40 groups (119 participants) in the control construal condition. 20 groups (60 





participants missed an average of .21 questions (SD = 1.32), with 94% of participants missing 
zero items. However, an independent samples t-test showed that participants in the abstract 
construal condition completed the manipulation with fewer errors (M = .03, SD = .18) compared 
to those in the concrete construal conditions (M = .39, SD = 1.86; p = .036). Despite this 
condition difference, due to the high rate of 100% accuracy, the full sample was retained in the 
subsequent analysis.  
Test of hypotheses: Consequences of Group Entitativity. I expected that individuals in 
homogeneous groups would report greater perceptions of interpersonal similarity (H1) and 
relationship focus (H2) relative to individuals in diverse groups in the abstract and control 
construal conditions, but that this difference would be minimized in the concrete construal 
condition. 
Perceptions of General Interpersonal Similarity. There were no main effects or 
interactions of our manipulations for individuals’ perceptions of general interpersonal similarity 
prior to the group discussion (all ps > .21).  
Expectations of Opinion Similarity and Difference. There were no main effects or 
interactions of our manipulations for either measure of task-relevant interpersonal similarity (all 
ps > .17) prior to the group discussion. Examining the effects of group composition within the 
control construal condition, however, showed that individuals in diverse groups thought 
interpersonal differences in opinion were more likely (M = 5.25, SD = 1.16) compared to 
individuals in homogeneous groups (M = 4.83, SD = 1.21; t(117) = 1.94, p = .055), to a marginal 





 Relationship Focus. I did not replicate findings from the previous study in regards to 
individuals’ focus on building positive relationships with their group members. There were no 
main effects or interactions of our manipulations (all ps > .21) contrary to expectations.  
Test of hypotheses: Communication Norms. I expected that individuals in 
homogeneous groups would be less willing to express their unique perspectives (H3) relative to 
individuals in diverse groups in the abstract and control construal conditions, but that this 
difference would be minimized in the concrete construal condition. Likewise, I expected 
homogeneous groups to have shorter discussion times (H4) and less equal participation between 
group members (H5) compared to diverse groups in the abstract and control construal conditions, 
but that this difference would be minimized in the concrete construal condition. 
Perceived Voice. There were no main effects or interactions of our manipulations for 
individuals’ feelings of voice during the group discussion (all p > .31).  
Individual Speaking Contribution. Individuals also did not vary by condition in the 
number of speaking turns or the number of words spoken during group discussion (all ps > .50).  
However, post-hoc, I reasoned that individuals may have had more unique perspectives to 
potentially express when they held a minority opinion based on their initial hiring preference. As 
a result, individuals with a minority opinion may be more influenced by manipulations of group 
composition and construal level to express these opinions compared to group members who held 
opinions that their fellow group members agreed with. To assess this, I re-ran the analysis using 
a 2 (Group composition: Homogeneous or Diverse) X 3 (Construal Level: Abstract, Concrete, or 
Control) X 2 (Opinion Status: Minority Opinion or Majority Opinion) ANOVA. This additional 
analysis revealed a marginal interaction between group composition and opinion status for 





More specifically, there were no differences in the number of speaking turns for 
individuals who were in the opinion majority whether they were in homogeneous (M = 52.24, SD 
= 23.78) or in diverse groups (M = 52.11, SD = 28.68; p > .97). However, when individuals held 
a minority opinion, they spoke more frequently in diverse groups (M = 62.73, SD = 32.52) 
compared to when in homogeneous groups (M = 46.65, SD = 25.76; t(331) = 2.44, p = .015). In 
even stronger support of the idea that diverse contexts may shape norms to express individual 
viewpoints, within diverse groups, individuals who held minority opinions actually spoke more 
frequently than those who held the majority opinion (t(331) = 2.03, p = .043). Within 
homogeneous groups, members with minority and majority opinions spoke equally as much (p > 
.27). See Figure 3. This interaction effect was not further moderated by construal level. 
First-person singular pronouns. Individuals’ willingness to express their unique 
perspectives was also assessed linguistically using LIWC text analysis. A 2 (Group composition: 
Homogeneous or Diverse) X 3 (Construal Level: Abstract, Concrete, or Control) ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of group composition, F(1, 109) = 6.34, p = .013. Consistent 
with expectations, diverse groups used more first-person singular pronouns during their group 
discussions (M = 4.73, SD = 1.04) compared to homogeneous groups (M = 4.22, SD = 1.14). 
However, this effect was not further moderated by construal level.  
Group Discussion Time. There were no main effects or interactions of our manipulations 
for how long groups discussed the decision (all ps > .70). Groups discussed the hiring decision 
for 12.27 minutes on average (SD = 3.51). 
Equal Participation. The variance in the total number of speaking turns between group 
members as well as the variance in the total number of words spoken between group members 





Test of hypotheses: Task-relevant Cognition and Decision-Making Performance. I 
expected that individuals in homogeneous groups would discuss task-relevant information less 
thoroughly relative to individuals in diverse groups in the abstract and control construal 
conditions, but that this difference would be minimized in the concrete construal condition (H6). 
Likewise, I expected homogeneous groups to perform worse than diverse groups in the abstract 
and control construal conditions, but that this difference would be minimized in the concrete 
construal condition (H7). Additionally, I expected homogeneous groups to use more abstract and 
less concrete language compared to diverse groups in the abstract and control construal 
conditions but not in the concrete construal condition (H8). 
Discussion Thoroughness. A 2 X 3 ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between 
group composition and construal level for discussion thoroughness, F(1, 113.23) = 4.46, p = 
.014. However, the nature of this interaction was not as expected. More specifically, in the 
control construal condition, individuals in homogeneous groups reported significantly greater 
discussion thoroughness (M = 5.98, SD = 1.08) compared to individuals in diverse groups (M = 
5.48, SD = 1.44), t(349) = 2.42, p = .016. Likewise, in the abstract construal condition, 
individuals in homogeneous groups reported marginally greater discussion thoroughness (M = 
5.98, SD = .99) compared to individuals in diverse groups (M = 5.60, SD = 1.21), t(349) = 1.89, 
p = .060. In the concrete construal condition, this pattern was reversed with individuals in diverse 
groups reporting marginally greater discussion thoroughness (M = 6.10, SD = .82) relative to 
individuals in homogeneous groups (M = 5.70, SD = 1.13), t(349) = 1.88, p = 061. See Figure 4.  
Group Decision-making Accuracy. Of 119 decision-making groups, only 23 selected the 
best candidate. A binary logistic regression with group composition, construal level, and their 





interactions of our manipulations for group decision accuracy, all ps > .14. Condition 
breakdowns for groups who chose correctly were 14 diverse and 9 homogeneous, and 7 abstract, 
8 control, and 8 concrete. 
Concrete Language Use. To assess more concrete language use in decision-making 
groups, I utilized the Brysbaert et al. (2014) concreteness dictionary and LIWC2015 
subdictionaries of common verbs, comparisons, differentiation, and present focus.   
Concreteness. A 2 X 3 ANOVA revealed a marginal main effect of group composition 
on the concreteness of language used during group discussion as measured by Brysbaert et al. 
(2014) database of concreteness ratings, F(1,109) = 3.52, p = .063. Contrary to my expectations, 
homogeneous groups used marginally more concrete language (M = 2.35, SD = .05) compared to 
diverse groups (M = 2.33, SD = .05). 
Common Verbs. There was a significant main effect of group composition on the use of 
common verbs during group discussion, F(1, 109) = 10.33, p = .002. In the expected direction, 
diverse groups used more common verbs (M = 20.12, SD = 1.52) compared to homogeneous 
groups (M = 19.14, SD = 1.56).  
Comparisons. Analysis revealed a marginal main effect of group composition on the use 
of comparison language, F(1, 109) = 2.85, p = .095. In the expected pattern, diverse groups used 
marginally more comparison language (M = 5.44, SD = 1.84) compared to homogeneous groups 
(M = 4.90, SD = 1.54).  
Differentiation. There was also a marginal main effect of group composition on the use 
of differentiating language, F(1, 109) = 3.44, p = .066. In the expected pattern, diverse groups 
used marginally more differentiating language (M = 4.57, SD = .66) compared to homogeneous 





Present Focus. For the last linguistic indicator of more concrete construal, analysis 
revealed a marginal main effect of group composition on groups’ focus on the present in the 
expected direction, F(1,109) = 2.79, p = .098. More specifically, diverse groups used marginally 
more present-focused language (M = 14.76, SD = 1.58) compared to homogeneous groups (M = 
14.27, SD = 1.37). 
Abstract Language Use. To assess more abstract language in decision-making groups, I 
utilized LIWC2015 subdictionaries of analytical thinking (categorical language) and certainty. 
Analytical Thinking (Categorical Language). There was a marginal main effect of group 
composition on analytical language used during group discussion, F(1,109) = 3.27, p = .073, in 
the expected direction. Homogeneous groups used marginally more analytical thinking 
(categorical language) words (M = 23.17, SD = 7.19) compared to diverse groups (M = 20.34, SD 
= 8.14).  
Certainty. Finally, I assessed linguistic differences in certainty language as an indicator 
of more abstract construal. A 2 X 3 ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of construal level, 
F(2, 109) = 5.34, p = .006. Groups in the abstract condition used significantly more certainty 
language (M = 1.50, SD = .38) compared to groups in the control condition (M = 1.19, SD = .46; 
p = .002) and marginally more certainty language compared to groups in the concrete condition 
(M = 1.34, SD = .39; p = .089). The use of certainty language did not differ between the concrete 
and control construal conditions (p = .13), nor did it vary by group composition. Table 5 shows 
means, standard deviations, and pair-wise significance tests for all linguistic measures by group 








 The current study was an ambitious attempt to replicate and theoretically extend findings 
from Chapter 2’s study that construal level moderates the impact of group composition on 
relational goals and thorough information processing, as well as establish links between group 
composition and various indicators of construal level within a data-rich laboratory setting. My 
success in meeting these goals was mixed which I discuss in detail below. 
Relationship Focus 
 First, I was not able to replicate findings from Chapter 2 for group members’ relationship 
focus nor for discussion thoroughness. In the case of relationship focus, no differences emerged 
as a result of the experimental manipulations—group composition, construal level, or their 
interaction. Notably, relationship focus was assessed in slightly different ways between the two 
studies. In Chapter 2’s study, I asked participants to indicate how much more important it was to 
get along than to get the right answer, as well as how much more important it was to get the right 
answer than to get along. I reverse-scored the second item and aggregated responses to the 
questions together as has been done in previous research examining homogeneous and diverse 
decision-making groups (Loyd et al., 2013). When measured this way, we might think of 
relationship focus as reflecting a tradeoff between social- and task-related goals.  
 In the current study, I sought to remove this tradeoff and assess individuals’ social goals 
of establishing connection independent of task-related goals. This was done in order to more 
closely assess proposed processes that stem from greater perceptions of entitativity in groups that 
are task-irrelevant within the theoretical framework I set forth. Accordingly, I asked participants 
how important it was to get along in addition to how much more important it was to get along 





to assess relationship focus did not form a reliable scale. However, what was surprising was that 
this new measurement yielded no differences by group composition or construal level.  
It could be the case that within decision-making contexts, consequences of greater 
perceptions of group entitativity are viewed by group members as coming at the expense of 
meeting task-related goals. If so, a more accurate assessment of relationship focus would include 
this tradeoff. Another possibility for not replicating this effect could also stem from the 
experimental context more generally. Within the lab context, there was no expectation for future 
interactions between group members. This coupled with the use of a minimal group social 
category distinction for the basis of group homogeneity/diversity as well as a monetary incentive 
for better performance may have created a floor effect whereby relationship goals were irrelevant 
to participants in the current study relative to the goal of performing well.  
While the overall group mean for the relationship focus scale in Chapter 2 (M = 3.76, SD 
= 1.79) did not seem to differ much from the single relationship-over-task tradeoff item used in 
the current assessment (M = 3.70, SD = 1.48), interestingly, individuals in diverse groups seemed 
to have higher levels of relationship focus in the lab (M = 3.84, SD = 1.89) than in the classroom 
(M = 3.48, SD = 1.42) while individuals in homogeneous groups seemed to have greater 
relationship focus in the classroom (M = 3.95, SD = 1.52) relative to the lab (M = 3.67, SD = 
1.68). It is difficult to make strong claims about what these differences mean, but it does seem 
reasonable to speculate that the two study contexts differed along multiple dimensions that may 
have shaped group members’ goals of establishing positive relationships within their group. 
Discussion Thoroughness 
 While the pattern of differences between homogeneous and diverse group members’ 





nature of these patterns was opposite of what was hypothesized. Individuals in homogeneous 
groups reported being more thorough than those in diverse groups at baseline and when 
construing more abstractly (although to a slightly lesser degree in the latter condition). 
Furthermore, within the concrete construal condition, individuals in diverse groups reported 
higher discussion thoroughness than those in homogeneous groups. Indeed, the nature of this 
finding seems to suggest better information processing under conditions of fit—members of 
homogeneous groups are more thorough at more abstract (and baseline) levels of construal, and 
diverse groups are more thorough at more concrete levels of construal. Perhaps in one-off 
interactions where there are high incentives to perform well, individuals in decision-making 
groups have better quality decision-making processes when contextual cues (i.e., primes of 
construal) match their inner states. On the other hand, greater fit between situationally-induced 
construal level and how group members presumably construed due to their group composition 
may have only led group members to feel as though they were more thorough during their group 
discussions. Objective assessments of discussion thoroughness are needed to decipher between 
these possibilities.  
 It is also worth noting that while in the classroom study, individuals in diverse groups 
responded consistently across primes of construal level and those in homogeneous groups 
showed greater movement, the opposite is true in the current study. Indeed, individuals in 
homogeneous groups indicated equal levels of discussion thoroughness regardless of construal 
condition. Discussion thoroughness for individuals in diverse groups was bolstered, however, by 
a more concrete construal level relative to the control and category conditions. This calls into 
question the asymmetry in responsiveness to construal level primes that I assumed within my 





diverse groups respond to primes of construal level. When this occurs for different types of 
groups may depend on the particular decision-making context. 
Performance 
 Similar to the classroom study, I did not observe differences in decision accuracy 
between homogeneous and diverse groups in the lab setting despite having a limit of fifteen 
minutes to reach their decisions. It is possible that the decision-making task that was used in the 
current study was too difficult to observe variance along the performance outcome. Indeed, only 
19% of groups selected the objectively best candidate to hire. Another possibility could be that 
all groups were highly motivated to perform well due to the one-off nature of the task, relatively 
low social demands to form interpersonal relationships, and the promise of a monetary incentive 
for accurate decisions. This strong performance incentive structure may have overpowered 
manipulations of group composition and construal level. 
Finally, although the decision-making task in the current study was chosen as one that I 
believed would be fostered by more concrete construal level (i.e., attending to individualized, 
anecdotal evidence of job candidates’ characteristics), like many real-life organizational tasks, 
the hiring decision may have ultimately required both abstract and concrete information 
processing. Indeed, while it may have been necessary to first process in a more concrete manner 
to uncover all information, later stages of the decision-making process may have been bolstered 
by a shift to more abstract constual—aggregating and taking a more holistic view of the 
information available (e.g., similar to demonstrated benefits of construal shifts; see Steinbach, 
Gamache, & Johnson, in press). If so, observable performance differences between 
homogeneous and diverse groups stemming from different levels of (static) construal may have 





Communication Norms  
 Though not on all measures of individuals’ contributions to the group discussion, I did 
find support for many of the hypothesized relationships between group composition and the way 
group members communicate during the decision-making exercise. Despite no differences in 
how much individuals’ subjectively felt that they had voice during their group discussions, 
individuals who held a minority opinion spoke more frequently in diverse groups relative to 
homogeneous ones. This is consistent with previous findings from the groups and teams 
literature that individuals’ are more willing to express dissenting opinions in diverse groups 
(Phillips & Loyd, 2006; Phillips et al., 2006; Toosi et al., 2012). These differences in 
individuals’ contributions to the group discussion did not extend, however, to how long groups 
discussed the task nor the equality of participation among group members.  
I also found supportive evidence of different communication norms within diverse and 
homogeneous groups using a novel, linguistic indicator of individual expression. More 
specifically, diverse groups used more first-person singular pronouns like “I”, “my”, and “mine” 
during their discussions compared to homogeneous groups. Within the current context, these 
pronouns were likely used to express what individual group members personally thought about 
the decision task. While not originally intended as such, the use of first-person singular pronouns 
may also be an indicator of less group entitativity in diverse groups. In fact, this finding provides 
the most direct evidence of the proposed claim that members of diverse groups construe 
themselves more concretely as individuals relative to members of homogeneous groups.  
Following this reasoning, I conducted additional post-hoc LIWC analysis on a linguistic 
indicator that may instead signal greater entitativity—the use of first-person plural pronouns 





level for this measure (ps > .61). Even still, differences in the use of first-person singular 
pronouns between homogeneous and diverse groups suggest an alternative means for assessing 
group entitativity during decision-making groups’ interactions. Unlike subjective measures of 
perceived interpersonal similarity or downstream consequences of entitativity such as 
relationship focus, linguistic markers for how group members’ construe the group more 
abstractly versus more concretely may be less prone to demand characteristics and are likely 
automatic.  
Additional Linguistic Analysis 
 The use of linguistic analysis on groups’ discussion transcripts also allowed for the 
assessment of relative differences in construal level between homogeneous and diverse groups 
along additional cognitive dimensions. Indeed, one suggested benefit of utilizing construal level 
theory to help understand information processing in homogeneous and diverse groups is the 
ability to make predictions for how these groups may differ along a wide range of psychological 
outcomes that are associated with more abstract versus more concrete construal level. One of 
these outcomes is the use of more abstract/concrete language. To the extent that homogeneous 
groups construe less concretely and more abstractly than diverse groups, their speech should also 
be less concrete—utilizing fewer verbs (e.g., Semin & Fiedler, 1988), making fewer distinctions 
between objects (e.g., Förster, Liberman, & Kuschel, 2008), and focusing less on the here and 
now (e.g., Bhatia & Walasek, 2006; Snefjella & Kuperman, 2015). Likewise, speech in 
homogeneous group should be more abstract than that in diverse groups—using more categorical 
language (e.g., Pennebaker, Chung, Frazee, Lavergne, & Beaver, 2014) and expressing more 





 The results of the LIWC analyses were largely consistent with these predictions: 
homogeneous groups used significantly less verbs, and marginally less comparisions, 
differentiation, and present-focused language relative to diverse groups. Furthermore, 
homogeneous groups used marginally more categorical language (labeled “analytical thinking” 
in LIWC) than diverse groups. Interestingly, the measure of certainty language was the only 
linguistic variable where differences emerged due to the construal manipulation whereby groups 
primed with more abstract construal used more certainty language than those primed to construe 
more concretely. Indeed, it is somewhat surprising that although group composition predicted 
differences in natural language that were consistent with indicators of construal level, direct 
manipulations of construal level did not influence these outcomes.  
It could be that when assessing the content of natural language within interpersonal 
communication—a social context—more social primes of construal level like group composition 
have stronger effects than non-social primes (i.e., selecting category vs exemplar words). It is 
also worth noting that the one finding from the current linguistic analysis that was incongruent 
with expectations was the direct measure of concreteness using the Brysbaert et al. (2014) 
database. For this measure, homogeneous groups were marginally more concrete in their 
discussions relative to diverse groups. It is unclear why this discrepancy occurred for this 
particular measure. However, by using multiple linguistic indicators of groups’ construal, we can 
be relatively confident in the general pattern of findings—diverse groups communicate using 









 Many of the effects found for group composition in the current study— for group 
members’ contributions, as well as groups’ level of abstraction/concreteness in language—while 
consistent with the theoretical framework presented, were not moderated by manipulations of 
construal level. I initially reasoned that if group composition shapes various downstream 
consequences of information processing in decision-making groups due to its influence on 
construal level, by directly manipulating construal level, I would be able to turn these effects on 
and off. Indeed, this would have provided more support for construal level as a cognitive 
mechanism by which group composition impacts perceptions of group entitativity, 
communication norms, and additional task-based cognitions within decision-making groups. 
However, without moderation effects of construal, it remains unclear whether group differences 
emerged due to members’ more abstract versus more concrete construal of homogeneous and 
diverse groups.  
Summary 
Although the current study did not replicate findings from Chapter 2, it did offer many 
useful insights on how construal level may emerge within homogeneous and diverse decision-
making groups. More specifically, the results of this investigation provide preliminary evidence 
that members of diverse groups view themselves more as individuals than as groups—using 
more first-person singular pronouns during group discussions. Additionally, consistent with this 
greater perception of individuality in diverse groups and in replication of previous work in the 
groups and teams literature, group members are more likely to express their unique viewpoints 
when they are in diverse compared to homogeneous teams. Diverse groups also seem to use 





and differentiating between targets, using more action-orientated language, and focusing more on 
the present—compared to homogeneous groups. These findings suggest that group composition 
shapes group members’ cognitive orientation in ways that influence how information is 
processed with decision-making groups. While no performance effects were observed in the 
current study, findings from the linguistic analysis suggest that homogeneous and diverse groups 
may generate better solutions on tasks that require more abstract versus more concrete construal, 
respectively.  
In the remaining chapter, I discuss possibilities for the different pattern of findings 
between the studies in Chapters 2 and 3, reflect on the challenges and opportunities for 
conducting group decision-making research, as well as point to ongoing and future directions 
that stem from the proposed theoretical framework of construal level in homogeneous and 
















CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 While teams are an integral component to the information-processing strategies of most 
organizations, whereby individuals come together as groups to solve complex problems and 
make important decisions, studying group decision-making processes empirically remains 
challenging. However, when done mindfully, this research can shed important light on a range of 
cognitive processes that emerge within decision-making groups. Furthermore, a better 
understanding of these cognitions can provide the means for enhancing the way groups process 
information and reach joint decisions. In the current context, while the studies in Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3 both provide valuable insights into group decision-making processes when reviewed 
separately, due to inconsistent findings between the studies, it is difficult to make general claims 
about the role of construal level in shaping information processing in homogeneous and diverse 
groups. Ultimately, more research is needed to decipher these discrepancies and to systematically 
identify contextual factors that shape how these effects emerge. However, I speculate about why 
I may have observed different patterns of findings within the two studies below, as well as 
challenges and opportunities of researching group-decision making within classrooms and within 
the laboratory. 
 Context Matters 
 It is not shocking to anyone who investigates human behavior that context is critically 
important for shaping how psychological processes emerge both within and amongst individuals. 
However, when studying group decision-making, subtle and not-so-subtle differences between 
experimental contexts can be easily disregarded in the hopes of collecting data that is relatively 
“expensive” compared to assessments of individual psychological processes. Within the current 





additional classroom setting as well as in the lab study that was described in Chapter 3. 
Collecting comparable classroom and laboratory data turned out to be more difficult than 
anticipated, however.  
 For one, the executive education program in which I collected the first study provided a 
unique context where students had not yet formed relationships with one another, there were 
existing meaningful social category dimensions not confounded with status differences, and there 
was the promise of future interaction with group members. Each of these factors will be 
important to consider during future data collections. Additionally, within this particular 
classroom setting, executives participating in the leadership program seemed relatively engaged 
and invested in the classroom activity. The executive education program also provided a stable 
setting for groups to complete the activity. By comparison, in another attempt to collect 
classroom data to replicate these findings, groups’ completion of the construal manipulation and 
of their group discussions were abruptly interrupted as groups had to move classrooms due to a 
room scheduling conflict with another class. 
 For reasons such as these, conducting group decision-making research in the laboratory 
where there is considerable control over research activity can be attractive. However, it is 
important to recognize key differences in how participants may relate to one another within and 
outside of the lab. For instance, within the lab study described in Chapter 3, I underestimated that 
the one-off nature of the interaction may enhance epistemic motives of getting the right answer 
and diminish social motives of getting along with group members. Indeed, the more formal 
nature of the setting may have led participants to primarily be task-focused. While I introduced a 
monetary performance incentive to increase general engagement within the lab, this may have 





introduce a more informal getting-to-know-you activity before group members begin on the task 
to better mimic social dynamics in actual organizations.  
Additional Differences 
 The two studies also differed in additional ways that may have influenced results. For 
one, moving into the laboratory greatly influenced the demographics of my study sample. Not 
only was the laboratory sample relatively younger than that of the executive education program, 
but the racial and national composition was also vastly different. In the initial study, participants 
had an average age of 35 years, were mostly white (49%) and primarily from the United States 
(76%). In the lab, participants were younger—24 years old on average—and the most prominent 
racial group was Asian Americans (48%). On the whole, the lab sample was also more 
international with only 43% of participants born in the United States. While it is unclear how 
exactly these demographic changes may have shaped the emergence of construal level in 
homogeneous and diverse groups and reactions to the manipulations, it is very likely that there 
was some influence. Indeed, in the lab, other dimensions of diversity may have been salient in a 
way that was not consistent across my manipulations of group composition and construal level. 
Unfortunately, other ways of assessing diversity within groups such as groups’ composition in 
terms of national diversity were not evenly distributed across manipulations of construal level in 
order for me to conduct follow up analysis along this dimension. 
Another example of differences between the two studies presented here was the decision 
task used. In the classroom study, participants completed a murder mystery activity that has been 
used in previous research to study group decision-making processes. In the lab, I instead chose a 
hiring decision task (designed as a classroom activity) in order to see if the pattern of findings I 





of findings between the two decision-making tasks would have suggested high robustness for the 
hypothesized psychological processes, with so many other additional changes between the 
studies, it is difficult to know whether the differences I found were due to the task or other 
contextual features. Because collecting group data can be particularly time consuming when 
done outside out of classroom environments (which have their own set of associated challenges 
as previously discussed), it is tempting to take a double-barreled approach when designing new 
studies in order to extend findings to the greatest extent. However, in future data collections, it is 
worth implementing incremental changes between study designs as one would when studying 
individual-level phenomena.  
Opportunities in Group Decision-Making Research and Future Directions 
 Despite these challenges, the current set of findings—particularly those in the lab—
highlight many opportunities afforded by conducting this type of research. For one, studying 
group decision-making in the lab allows for very precise coding of how groups process 
information that is hard to accurately capture through self-report measures. In the current lab 
study, for instance, I was able to video-record and transcribe groups’ full interactions verbatim. 
This allowed for precise measurement of how frequently and for how long each group member 
spoke. In ongoing directions of this work, I not only record what task-relevant information was 
uncovered during group interactions, but also assess how each piece of information was 
interpreted and integrated into the group discussion as groups came to their final decision.  In 
addition, by recording groups’ interactions, I was able to conduct linguistic analysis of groups’ 
natural speech when communicating about the task. It was this approach that allowed me to 
assess more abstract versus more concrete psychological profiles within homogeneous and 





preferred technique when trying to assess differences in construal level—an elusive construct to 
measure directly during group interactions—in the context of group decision-making.  
On the other hand, while such in depth analysis is often not afforded by classroom data 
collections, in these settings, existing and meaningful social category differences already exist 
and allow for an assessment of group decision-making processes that are more reflective of 
actual organizations. Indeed, within this context, both relationships and task performance matter 
as interactions are often ongoing over time, and students have a learning orientation. While direct 
comparisons between findings in the classroom and the laboratory may not be easily made, both 
settings have their own set of strengths and weaknesses that make up for one another. These 
differences should be kept in mind when designing future studies. 
Conclusion 
  Utilizing the proposed framework for information processing in homogeneous and 
diverse decision-making groups provided many insights that are both practically and 
theoretically useful. I argued that a group’s composition may shape how members construe the 
group—either more abstractly or more concretely. In homogeneous groups where there is salient 
social category similarity, group members may construe their group more abstractly as a group, 
while members of diverse groups may instead construe their group more concretely as 
individuals. This more abstract versus more concrete level of construal is likely to shape social 
goals as well as how individuals understand and exchange information within the group. Indeed, 
I found that at a more abstract level of construal, members of homogeneous groups are more 
focused on building positive relationships which in turn leads them to discuss information less 
thoroughly than diverse groups. However, by priming a more concrete construal, I was able to 





diverse relative to homogeneous groups allowed members to voice their unique perspectives and 
gave way to a more concrete discussion of the task as assessed by linguistic markers of 
concreteness. It is my hope that this conception of group decision-making processes in which 
group composition changes group members’ cognitive orientation will continue to supplement 
purely additive views of diversity in a way that extends our theoretical and practical 
































Figure 1: Graphs for the Moderating Impact of Construal Level on (A) Relationship Focus 
and (B) Discussion Thoroughness in Homogeneous and Diverse Groups in Chapter 2 
 
(A) Relationship Focus 
 






Figure 2: Mediation Model of Group Composition on Discussion Thoroughness through 
Relationship Focus as a Function of Construal Level in Chapter 2 
 
 
Conditional indirect effects of group composition on discussion thoroughness at values of 
moderators: 
Concrete Construal: indirect effect = .01, SE = .05, CI95 = -.11, .12 
Abstract Construal: indirect effect = -.25, SE = .12, CI95 = -.51, -.04 










Figure 3: Graph for the Moderating Impact of Opinion Status on Individual Contribution 












Figure 4: Graph for the Moderating Impact of Construal Level on Discussion 
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Appendix A: Questionnaires used in Chapter 2 Study 
Pre-discussion Questions 
1. How likely are you to discover similarities in opinion in your group discussion? 
2. How reassuring would it feel to find similarities in opinion during your group discussion? 
3. How likely are you to discover differences in opinion in your group discussion? 
4. How comfortable are you discussing differences in opinion about the Murder Mystery 
during your group discussion? 
5. How threatening would it feel to find differences in opinion during your group 
discussion? 
6. How happy would you be to find that your group members agree with you about the 
Murder Mystery suspect? 
7. How surprised would you be to find that your group members disagree with you about 
the Murder Mystery suspect? 
8. How disappointed would you be to find that your group members disagree with you 
about the Murder Mystery suspect? 
9. How likely will differences in opinion about the Murder Mystery negatively impact your 
group discussion? 
10. I feel that it is more important for us to get along than for us to get the right answer to the 
Murder Mystery. 
11. I feel that it is more important for us to get the right answer to the Murder Mystery than 
for us to get along. 
 
Post-discussion Questions 
1. How confident are you that your group made the right decision? 
2. How excited do you feel about working with these particular group members in the 
future? 
3. How much do you like these group members? 
4. I felt that other group members accepted me as a member of the group. 
5. I felt the group was interested in what I had to say. 
6. I felt like I made an important contribution to the group. 
7. How effectively did your group work together? 
8. How satisfied were you with the group decision-making process? 
9. How much did you feel like you were free to express your opinion? 
10. How comfortable were you voicing your viewpoints? 
11. How much did you feel like your group had team spirit? 
12. To what degree could you see yourself telling your friends about how great it is to work 
with these particular group members? 
13. To what extent was your group cohesive? 
14. To what extent were there differences of opinion in your group? 
15. How often did information get shared in the group that you didn’t think was that 






Appendix A (continued): Questionnaires used in Chapter 2 Study 
Post-discussion Questions (continued) 
 
16. How often did people express opinions that were not in line with your initial thinking 
about the case? 
17. How frequently were there surprises in the group about the importance of particular 
pieces of information? 
18. Do you think the group discussed the information thoroughly? 
19. Was there information you wanted to share that you didn’t because you didn’t think it 
would be seen as important? 
20. Was there information you wish you had shared that you didn’t because of time 
constraints? 
21. Was there information you wish the group had dug into deeper but others didn’t think 
was that important? 
22. I think discussing differences in opinion helped us get to a better decision. 
23. I think group members sharing their unique views on the Murder Mystery case was useful 
for our group. 
24. I think discussing the different opinions our group members had helped me process the 
information better. 
25. How similar did you feel to other members in your group? 
26. How well did you know the other members of your group before your discussion today? 
27. How often did you think about your program team membership during the Murder 
Mystery discussion? 
28. How often did anyone mention their program team membership during the Murder 
Mystery discussion? 
29. How much do you think your program team membership influenced your Murder 
Mystery discussion? 
30. Do you think the Murder Mystery discussion will influence your future interactions in 













Appendix B: Questionnaires used in Chapter 3 Study 
Pre-discussion Questions 
1. How similar do you feel to the other members in your group?  
2. Do you feel you have a lot in common with the other members of your group?  
3. How likely are you to discover similarities in opinion in your group discussion?  
4. How reassuring would it feel to find similarities in opinion during your group discussion?  
5. How likely are you to discover differences in opinion in your group discussion? 
6. How comfortable are you discussing differences in opinion about the hiring decision 
during your group discussion?  
7. How threatening would it feel to find differences in opinion during your group 
discussion?  
8. How happy would you be to find that your group members agree with you during the 
discussion?  
9. How surprised would you be to find that your group members disagree with you during 
the discussion?  
10. How disappointed would you be to find that your group members disagree with you 
during the discussion?  
11. How likely will differences in opinion negatively impact your group discussion?  
12. I feel that it is important for us to get along during the discussion.  
13. I feel that it is important for us to get the right answer during the discussion.  
14. I feel that it is more important for us to get along than for us to get the right answer.  
 
Post-discussion Questions 
1. How confident are you that your group made the right decision?  
2. How much do you agree with your group’s decision?  
3. How excited would you feel about working with these group members in the future?  
4. How much do you like these group members?  
5. I felt that other group members accepted me as a member of the group.  
6. I felt the group was interested in what I had to say.  
7. I felt like I made an important contribution to the group.   
8. How effectively did your group work together?  
9. How satisfied were you with the group’s decision-making process?  
10. How much did you feel like you were free to express your opinion?  
11. How comfortable were you voicing your viewpoints?  
12. How much did you feel like your group had team spirit?  
13. To what degree could you see yourself telling your friends about how great it is to work 
with these group members?  
14. To what extent was your group cohesive?  
15. To what extent were there differences of opinion in your group?  
16. How often did information get shared in the group that you didn’t think was that 






Appendix B (continued): Questionnaires used in Chapter 3 Study 
Post-discussion Questions (continued) 
17. How often did people express opinions that were not in line with your initial thinking 
about the hiring decision?  
18. How frequently were there surprises in the group about the importance of particular 
pieces of information?  
19. Do you think the group discussed the information thoroughly?  
20. Was there information you wanted to share that you didn’t because you didn’t think it 
would be seen as important?  
21. Was there information you wish you had shared that you didn’t because of time 
constraints?  
22. Was there information you wish the group had dug into deeper but others didn’t think 
was that important?  
23. I think discussing differences in opinion helped us get to a better decision.  
24. I think group members sharing their unique views about the hiring decision was useful 
for our group.  
25. I think discussing the different opinions our group members had helped me process the 
information better.  
26. During the group discussion, to what extent were you focused on how to make an 
accurate group decision?  
27. How often did you think about your type during the group discussion?  
28. How often did anyone mention their type during the group discussion?  
29. How much do you think your type influenced your group discussion? 
30. I dislike questions which can be answered in many different ways.  
31. I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes.  
32. When I have made a decision, I feel relieved.  
33. When I am confronted with a problem, I’m dying to reach a solution very quickly.  
34. I quickly become impatient and irritated if I do not find a solution to a problem 
immediately.  
35. I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view.  
 
